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Abstract
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a
divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete by oﬀering menus of
non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In
this context, we show that an equilibrium always exists and that aggregate equilibrium
allocations are generically unique. We provide a fully strategic foundation for Akerlof’s
(1970) partial pooling result: in equilibrium, goods of low quality are traded at the
same price, while goods of higher quality may end up not being traded at all if the
adverse selection problem is severe. We contrast our ﬁndings with those of standard
competitive screening models that postulate enforceability of exclusive contracts, and
we discuss their implications for empirical tests of adverse selection in ﬁnancial markets.
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Adverse selection is widely recognized as a major obstacle to the eﬃcient functioning of
markets. This is especially true on ﬁnancial markets, where buyers care about the quality
of the assets they purchase, and fear that sellers have superior information about it. The
same diﬃculties impede trade on second-hand markets and insurance markets. Theory
conﬁrms that adverse selection may indeed have a dramatic impact on economic outcomes.
First, all mutually beneﬁcial trades need not take place in equilibrium. For instance, in
Akerlof’s (1970) model of second-hand markets, only the lowest quality goods are traded at
the equilibrium price. Second, there may be diﬃculties with the very existence of equilibrium.
For instance, in Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) model of insurance markets, an equilibrium
fails to exist whenever the proportion of low-risk agents is too high.
Most contributions to the theory of competition under adverse selection have considered
frameworks in which competitors are restricted to make exclusive oﬀers. This assumption is
for instance appropriate in the case of car insurance, since law forbids to take out multiple
policies on a single vehicle. By contrast, competition on ﬁnancial markets is typically non-
exclusive, as each agent can trade with multiple partners who cannot monitor each others’
trades with the agent.1 This paper argues that this diﬀerence in the nature of competition
may have a signiﬁcant impact on the way adverse selection aﬀects market outcomes. This
has two important consequences, that we discuss in the conclusion. First, empirical studies
that test for the presence of adverse selection should use diﬀerent methods depending on
whether or not competition is exclusive. Second, the regulation of markets plagued by
adverse selection should be adjusted to the type of competition that prevails on them.
To illustrate these points, we consider a stylized model of trade under adverse selection.
In our model, a seller endowed with some quantity of a good attempts to trade it with a
ﬁnite number of buyers. The seller and the buyers have linear preferences over quantities and
transfers exchanged. In line with Akerlof (1970), the quality of the good is the seller’s private
information. Unlike in his model, the good is assumed to be perfectly divisible, so that any
fraction of the seller’s endowment can potentially be traded. An example that ﬁts these
assumptions is that of a ﬁrm which ﬂoats a security issue by relying on the intermediation
services of several investment banks. Buyers compete by simultaneously oﬀering menus of
1Examples of this phenomenon abound across industries. In the banking industry, Detragiache, Garella
and Guiso (2000), using a sample of small and medium-sized Italian ﬁrms, document that multiple banking
relationships are very widespread. In the credit card industry, Rysman (2007) shows that US consumers
typically hold multiple credit cards from diﬀerent networks, although they tend to concentrate their spending
on a single network. Cawley and Philipson (1999) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) report similar ﬁndings
for the US life insurance market and the UK annuity market.
1contracts, or, equivalently, price schedules.2 After observing the menus oﬀered, the seller
decides of her trade(s). Competition is exclusive if the seller can trade with at most one
buyer, and non-exclusive if trades with several buyers are allowed.
Under exclusive competition, our conclusions are qualitatively similar to Rothschild and
Stiglitz’s (1976). In a simple version of the model with two possible levels of quality, pure
strategy equilibria exist if and only if the probability that the good is of high quality is low
enough. Equilibria are separating: the seller trades her whole endowment when quality is
low, while she only trades part of it when quality is high.
The analysis of the non-exclusive competition game yields strikingly diﬀerent results.
Pure strategy equilibria always exist, both for binary and continuous quality distributions.
Aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique, and have an all-or-nothing feature:
depending of whether quality is low or high, the seller either trades her whole endowment or
does not trade at all. Buyers earn zero proﬁt on average in any equilibrium. These allocations
can be supported by simple menu oﬀers. For instance, there exists an equilibrium in which
every buyer oﬀers to buy any quantity at a given unit price. This price is equal to the
expectation of the buyers’ valuation of the good conditional on the seller accepting to trade
at that price. While other menu oﬀers are consistent with equilibrium, corresponding to
non-linear price schedules, an important insight of our analysis is that this price is also the
unit price at which all trades take place in any equilibrium.
These results are of course in line with Akerlof’s (1970) classic analysis of the market
for lemons, for which they provide a fully strategic foundation. It is worth stressing the
diﬀerences between his model and ours. Akerlof (1970) considers a market for a non-divisible
good of uncertain quality, in which all agents are price-takers. Thus, by assumption, all
trades must take place at the same price, in the spirit of competitive equilibrium models.
Equality of supply and demand determines the equilibrium price level, which is equal to the
average quality of the goods that are eﬀectively traded. Multiple equilibria may occur in a
generic way.3 By contrast, we allow agents to trade any fraction of the seller’s endowment.
Moreover, our model is one of imperfect competition, in which a ﬁxed number of buyers
choose their oﬀers strategically. In particular, our analysis does not rely on free entry
arguments. Finally, buyers can oﬀer arbitrary menus of contracts, including for instance
non-linear price schedules. That is, we avoid any a priori restrictions on instruments. The
2As established by Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002), there is no need to consider more
general mechanisms in this multiple-principal single-agent setting.
3This potential multiplicity of equilibria arises because buyers are assumed to be price-takers. Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green (1995, Proposition 13.B.1) show that the equilibrium is generically unique when buyers
strategically set prices for the non-divisible good oﬀered by the seller.
2fact that all trades take place at a constant unit price in equilibrium is therefore no longer
an assumption, but rather a consequence of our analysis.
A key to our results is that non-exclusive competition expands the set of deviations
that are available to the buyers. Indeed, each buyer can strategically use the oﬀers of his
competitors to propose additional trades to the seller. Such deviations are blocked by latent
contracts, that is, contracts that are not traded in equilibrium but which the seller ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to trade at the deviation stage. These latent contracts are not necessarily complex
nor exotic. For instance, in a linear price equilibrium, all the buyers oﬀer to purchase any
quantity of the good at a constant unit price, but only a ﬁnite number of contracts can
end up being traded as long as the seller does not randomize on the equilibrium path. One
of the purposes of the other contracts, which are not traded in equilibrium, is to deter
cream-skimming deviations that aim at attracting the seller when quality is high. The use of
latent contracts has been criticized on several grounds. First, they may allow one to support
multiple equilibrium allocations, and even induce an indeterminacy of equilibrium.4 This
is not the case in our model, since aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique.
Second, a latent contract may appear as a non-credible threat, if the buyer who issues it
would make losses in the hypothetical case where the seller were to trade it.5 Again, this
need not be the case in our model. In fact, we construct examples of equilibria in which
latent contracts would be strictly proﬁtable if traded.
This paper is related to the literature on common agency between competing principals
dealing with a privately informed agent. In the context of incomplete information, a number
of recent contributions use standard mechanism design techniques to characterize equilibrium
allocations. The basic idea is that, given a proﬁle of mechanisms proposed by his competitors,
the best response of any single principal can be fully determined by focusing on simple menu
oﬀers corresponding to direct revelation mechanisms. This allows one to construct equilibria
that satisfy certain regularity conditions. This approach has been recently applied in various
common agency contexts.6 Closest to this paper is Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000),
who study non-exclusive competition among principals in a common value environment.
In their model, uninformed market-makers supply liquidity to an informed insider. The
insider’s preferences are quasi-linear, and quadratic with respect to quantities exchanged.
Unlike in our model, the insider has no capacity constraint. Variational techniques are
4In a complete information setting, Martimort and Stole (2003) show that latent contracts can be used
to support any level of trade between the perfectly competitive outcome and the Cournot outcome.
5Latent contracts with negative virtual proﬁts have been for example considered in Hellwig (1983).
6See for instance Martimort and Stole (2003), Calzolari (2004), Laﬀont and Pouyet (2004), Khalil,
Martimort and Parigi (2007) or Martimort and Stole (2009).
3used to construct an equilibrium in which market-makers post convex price schedules. Such
techniques do not apply in our model, as all agents have linear preferences and the seller
cannot trade more than her endowment. Instead, we allow for arbitrary menu oﬀers, and we
characterize candidate equilibrium allocations in the usual way, that is, by checking whether
they survive possible deviations. While this approach may be diﬃcult to apply in more
complex settings, it delivers several interesting new insights, in particular on the role of
latent contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 focuses on
a two-type setting. We show that there always exists a market equilibrium where buyers
play a pure strategy. In addition, equilibrium allocations are generically unique. We also
characterize equilibrium menu oﬀers, with special emphasis on latent contracts. Section 4
analyzes the general framework with a continuum of sellers’ types. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Non-Exclusive Trading under Asymmetric Information
There are two kinds of agents: a single seller, and a ﬁnite number of buyers indexed by
i = 1,...,n, where n ≥ 2. The seller has an endowment consisting of one unit of a perfectly
divisible good that she can trade with one or several buyers. Let qi be the quantity of the
good purchased by buyer i, and ti the transfer he makes in return. Feasible trade vectors
((q1,t1),...,(qn,tn)) are such that qi ≥ 0 and ti ≥ 0 for all i, with
P
i qi ≤ 1. Thus the
quantity of the good purchased by each buyer must be at least zero, and the sum of these
quantities cannot exceed the seller’s endowment.





i qi and T =
P
i ti denote aggregate quantities and transfers. Here θ is a
random variable that stands for the quality of the good as perceived by the seller. Each




Here v(θ) is a deterministic function of θ that stands for the quality of the good as perceived
by the buyers. Observe that there are no externalities across buyers beyond the fact that
the quantities they trade cannot in the aggregate exceed the seller’s endowment.
4We will typically assume that v(θ) is not a constant function of θ, so that both the seller
and the buyers care about θ. Gains from trade arise in this common value environment if
v(θ) > θ for some realization of θ. However, in line with Akerlof (1970), mutually beneﬁcial
trades are potentially impeded because the seller is privately informed of the quality of the
good at the trading stage. Following standard terminology, we shall hereafter refer to θ as
to the type of the seller.
Trading is non-exclusive in the sense that no buyer can contract on the trades that the
seller makes with his competitors.7 Thus, as in Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) or
Segal and Whinston (2003), a contract describes a bilateral trade between the seller and a
particular buyer; a menu is a set of such contracts. Buyers compete in menus for the good
oﬀered by the seller. The seller can simultaneously trade with several buyers, and optimally
combine the oﬀers made to her, subject to her endowment constraint. The following timing
of events characterizes our non-exclusive competition game:
1. Each buyer i proposes a menu of contracts, that is, a set Ci of quantity-transfer pairs
(qi,ti) ∈ [0,1] × R+ that contains at least the no-trade contract (0,0).8
2. After privately learning the quality θ, the seller selects one contract (qi,ti) from each
of the menus Ci’s oﬀered by the buyers, subject to the constraint that
P
i qi ≤ 1.
A pure strategy for the seller is a function that maps each type θ and each menu
proﬁle (C1,...,Cn) into a vector of contracts ((q1,t1),...,(qn,tn)) ∈ ([0,1] × R+)n such
that (qi,ti) ∈ Ci for all i and
P



















has a solution for any type θ and menu proﬁle (C1,...,Cn), we require the buyers’ menus
to be compact sets. Throughout the paper, and unless stated otherwise, the equilibrium
concept is pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
2.2 Applications
Our model is basically a model of trade, with the following features: the good is divisible;
its quality is the seller’s private information; and the seller may trade with several buyers.
7In particular, buyers cannot make transfers contingent on the whole proﬁle of quantities (q1,...,qn)
traded by the seller. This distinguishes our trading environment from a menu auction ` a la Bernheim and
Whinston (1986a).
8As usual, the assumption that each menu must contain the no-trade contract allows one to deal with
participation in a simple way.
5As such it can be applied to many markets. The following examples illustrate some possible
applications.
Financial Markets In line with DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) or Biais and Mariotti (2005),
one can think of the seller as an issuer attempting to raise cash by selling a security backed
by some of her assets, and of the buyers as underwriters managing the issue. Under risk-
neutrality, gains from trade arise in this context if the issuer discounts future cash-ﬂows
at a higher rate than the market; this may for instance reﬂect credit constraints or, in the
ﬁnancial services industry, binding minimum-capital requirements. The marginal cost of the
security for the issuer, that is, its value to the issuer if retained, is then only a fraction of
the value of the security to the underwriters: formally, one has θ = δv(θ) for some constant
δ ∈ (0,1). Here Q is the total fraction of the security sold by the issuer, while 1 − Q is the
residual fraction of the security that the issuer retains. It is natural to assume that, at the
issuing stage, the issuer has better information than the underwriters about the value of her
assets, and hence about the value of the security she issues.
Labor Market In an alternative interpretation of the model, the seller is a worker, and
the buyers are ﬁrms. The worker can work for several ﬁrms, and divide her time endowment
accordingly. This is for instance the case in legal or ﬁnancial services, where a consultant
typically works on behalf of several customers; similarly, a salesman can represent diﬀerent
companies. The worker’s type θ is her opportunity cost of selling one unit of her time to
any given ﬁrm, while v(θ) is the productivity of a worker of type θ. Here Q is the total
fraction of time spent working, while 1 − Q is the residual fraction of time that the worker
can spend on leisure. This interpretation diﬀers from the labor market model of Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green (1995, Chapter 13, Section B) in that labor is assumed to be divisible,
and competition for the worker’s services is non-exclusive.
Insurance Markets A ﬁnal interpretation of our setup is as a model of insurance provision,
where the insured’s preference are modeled using Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under
risk, so that her utility is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities. Here the roles of the
seller and of the buyers are reversed. There is a single insured, who can purchase insurance
from several insurance companies. The insured has wealth W, and can incur a loss L with
privately known probability x. An insurance contract consists of a reimbursement ri and of a
premium pi. The utility that the insured derives from aggregate reimbursements R =
P
i ri
and aggregate premia P =
P
i pi is
W − P − f(x)(L − R),




One assumes that overinsurance is prohibited, so that R is at most equal to L. Letting
ti = −pi, qi = ri, θ = −f(x) and v(θ) = −x leads back to our model. Gains from trade arise
in this context if some type of the issuer puts more weight on the occurrence of a loss than
the insurance company does, that is, if f(x) > x for some realization of x.
3 The Two-Type Case
In this section, we consider the binary version of our model in which the seller’s type can be
either low, θ = θ, or high, θ = θ, for some θ > θ > 0. Denote by ν ∈ (0,1) the probability
that θ = θ and by E the corresponding expectation operator. In order to focus on the most
interesting case, we assume that the seller’s and the buyers’ perceptions of the quality of the
good move together, that is, v(θ) > v(θ), and that it would be eﬃcient to trade no matter
the quality of the good, that is, v(θ) > θ and v(θ) > θ.
3.1 The Exclusive Competition Benchmark
As a benchmark, it is helpful to characterize the equilibrium outcomes under exclusive
competition, that is, when the seller can trade with at most one buyer, as in standard
models of competition under adverse selection. The timing of the exclusive competition
game is similar to that of the non-exclusive competition game, except that the second stage
is replaced by
2’. After privately learning the quality θ, the seller selects one contract (qi,ti) from one of
the menus Ci’s oﬀered by the buyers.






i for some i}.
Let (qe,te) and (qe,te) be the contracts traded by each type of the seller in an equilibrium
of the exclusive competition game. One has the following result.
Proposition 1 The following holds:
(i) Any equilibrium of the exclusive competition game is separating, with
(q
e,t












Hence, when the rules of the competition game are such that the seller can trade with at
most one buyer, the structure of market equilibria is formally analogous to that obtaining in
the competitive insurance model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). First, any pure strategy
equilibrium is separating, with type θ selling her whole endowment, qe = 1, and type θ only
selling a fraction of her endowment, 0 < qe < 1. The corresponding contracts are traded at
unit prices v(θ) and v(θ) respectively, yielding each buyer a zero payoﬀ. Second, type θ is





as stated in Proposition 1(i). The equilibrium is depicted on Figure 1. Point A
e corresponds
to the equilibrium contract of type θ, while point Ae corresponds to the equilibrium contract
of type θ. The two solid lines passing through these points are the equilibrium indiﬀerence
curves of type θ and type θ. The dotted line passing through the origin are indiﬀerence
curves for the buyers, with slopes v(θ) and v(θ).
—Insert Figure 1 here—
As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a pure strategy equilibrium exists under exclusivity
only under certain parameter restrictions. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium indiﬀerence curve of
type θ must lie above the indiﬀerence curve for the buyers with slope E[v(θ)] passing through
the origin, for otherwise there would exist a proﬁtable deviation attracting both types of the
seller. As stated in Proposition 1(ii), this is the case if and only if the probability ν that the
good is of high quality is low enough.
3.2 Equilibrium Outcomes under Non-Exclusive Competition
We now turn to the analysis of the non-exclusive competition model. We ﬁrst characterize
the restrictions that equilibrium behavior implies for the outcomes of the non-exclusive
competition game. Next, we show that this game always has an equilibrium in which buyers
post linear prices. Finally, we contrast the equilibrium outcomes with those arising in the
exclusive competition model.
83.2.1 Aggregate Equilibrium Allocations
Let ci = (qi,ti) and ci = (qi,t
i) be the contracts traded by the two types of the seller
with buyer i in equilibrium, and let (Q,T) =
P
i ci and (Q,T) =
P
i ci be the corresponding
aggregate equilibrium allocations. To characterize these allocations, one only needs to require
that three types of deviations by a buyer be blocked in equilibrium. In each case, the
deviating buyer uses the oﬀers of his competitors as a support for his own deviation. This
intuitively amounts to pivoting around the aggregate equilibrium allocation points (Q,T)
and (Q,T) in the (Q,T) space. We now consider each deviation in turn.
Attracting Type θ by Pivoting Around (Q,T) The ﬁrst type of deviations allows one
to prove that type θ always trades eﬃciently in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Q = 1 in any equilibrium.
One can illustrate the deviation used in Lemma 1 as follows. Observe ﬁrst that a basic
implication of incentive compatibility is that, in any equilibrium, Q cannot be higher than Q.
Suppose then that Q < 1 in a candidate equilibrium. This situation is depicted on Figure 2.
Point A corresponds to the aggregate equilibrium allocation (Q,T) traded by type θ, while
point A corresponds to the aggregate equilibrium allocation (Q,T) traded by type θ. The
two solid lines passing through these points are the equilibrium indiﬀerence curves of type θ
and type θ, with slopes θ and θ. The dotted line passing through A is an indiﬀerence curve
for the buyers, with slope v(θ).
—Insert Figure 2 here—
Suppose now that some buyer deviates and includes in his menu an additional contract
that makes available the further trade AA
0. This leaves type θ indiﬀerent, since she obtains
the same payoﬀ as in equilibrium. Type θ, by contrast, cannot gain by trading this new
contract. Assuming that the deviating buyer can break the indiﬀerence of type θ in his
favor, he strictly gains from trading the new contract with type θ, as the slope θ of the line
segment AA
0 is strictly less than v(θ). This contradiction shows that one must have Q = 1
in equilibrium. The assumption on indiﬀerence breaking is relaxed in the proof of Lemma 1.
Attracting Type θ by Pivoting Around (Q,T) Having established that Q = 1, we
now investigate the aggregate quantity Q traded by type θ in equilibrium. The second type
of deviations allows one to partially characterize the circumstances in which the two types
of the seller trade diﬀerent aggregate allocations in equilibrium. We say in this case that
9the equilibrium is separating. An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that Q < 1 in any
separating equilibrium. Let then p =
T−T
1−Q be the slope of the line connecting the points
(Q,T) and (1,T) in the (Q,T) space. Therefore p is the implicit unit price at which the
quantity 1 − Q can be sold to move from (Q,T) to (1,T). By incentive compatibility, p
must lie between θ and θ in any separating equilibrium. The strategic analysis of the buyers’
behavior induces further restrictions on p.
Lemma 2 In a separating equilibrium, p < θ implies that p ≥ v(θ).
In the proof of Lemma 1, we showed that, if Q < 1, then each buyer has an incentive to
deviate. By contrast, in the proof of Lemma 2, we only show that if p < min{v(θ),θ} in a
candidate separating equilibrium, then at least one buyer has an incentive to deviate. This
makes it more diﬃcult to graphically illustrate why the deviation used in Lemma 2 might
be proﬁtable. It is however easy to see why this deviation would be proﬁtable to an entrant
or, equivalently, to an inactive buyer that would not trade in equilibrium. This situation
is depicted on Figure 3. The dotted line passing through A is an indiﬀerence curve for the
buyers, with slope v(θ). Contrary to the conclusion of Lemma 2, the ﬁgure is drawn in such
a way that this indiﬀerence curve is strictly steeper than the line segment AA.
—Insert Figure 3 here—
Suppose now that the entrant oﬀers a contract that makes available the trade AA. This
leaves type θ indiﬀerent, since she obtains the same payoﬀ as in equilibrium by trading the
aggregate allocation (Q,T) together with the new contract. Type θ, by contrast, cannot
gain by trading this new contract. Assuming that the entrant can break the indiﬀerence of
type θ in his favor, he earns a strictly positive payoﬀ from trading the new contract with
type θ, as the slope p of the line segment AA is strictly less than v(θ). This shows that,
unless p ≥ v(θ), the candidate separating equilibrium is not robust to entry. The assumption
on indiﬀerence breaking is relaxed in the proof of Lemma 2, which further shows that the
proposed deviation is proﬁtable to at least one buyer.
Attracting both Types by Pivoting Around (Q,T) A separating equilibrium must
be robust to deviations that attract both types of the seller. This third type of deviations
allows one to ﬁnd a necessary condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium. When
this condition fails, both types of the seller must trade the same aggregate allocations in
equilibrium. We say in this case that the equilibrium is pooling.
10Lemma 3 If E[v(θ)] > θ, any equilibrium is pooling, with
(Q,T) = (Q,T) = (1,E[v(θ)]).
The proof of Lemma 3 consists in showing that if E[v(θ)] > θ in a candidate separating
equilibrium, then at least one buyer has an incentive to deviate. As for Lemma 2, this makes
it diﬃcult to graphically illustrate why this deviation might be proﬁtable. It is however easy
to see why this deviation would be proﬁtable to an entrant or, equivalently, to an inactive
buyer that would not trade in equilibrium. This situation is depicted on Figure 4. The dotted
line passing through A is an indiﬀerence curve for the buyers, with slope E[v(θ)]. Contrary
to the conclusion of Lemma 3, the ﬁgure is drawn in such a way that this indiﬀerence curve
is strictly steeper than the indiﬀerence curves of type θ.
—Insert Figure 4 here—
Suppose now that the entrant oﬀers a contract that makes available the trade AA
0. This
leaves type θ indiﬀerent, since she obtains the same payoﬀ as in equilibrium by trading the
aggregate allocation (Q,T) together with the new contract. Type θ strictly gains by trading
this new contract. Assuming that the entrant can break the indiﬀerence of type θ in his
favor, he earns a strictly positive payoﬀ from trading the new contract with both types as
the slope θ of the line segment AA
0 is strictly less than E[v(θ)]. This shows that, unless
E[v(θ)] ≤ θ, the candidate equilibrium is not robust to entry. Once again, the assumption
on indiﬀerence breaking is relaxed in the proof of Lemma 3, which further shows that the
proposed deviation is proﬁtable to at least one buyer.
The following result provides a partial converse to Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 If E[v(θ)] < θ, any equilibrium is separating, with
(Q,T) = (1,v(θ)) and (Q,T) = (0,0).
The following is an important corollary of our analysis.
Corollary 1 Each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any equilibrium.
Lemmas 1 to 4 provide a full characterization of the aggregate trades that can be sustained
in an equilibrium of the non-exclusive competition game. A key implication of Lemmas 3
and 4 is that the aggregate equilibrium allocation traded by the seller is generically unique.9
While each buyer always obtains a zero payoﬀ in equilibrium, the structure of equilibrium
allocations is directly aﬀected by the severity of the adverse selection problem:
9The non-generic case where E[v(θ)] = θ is discussed after Proposition 2.
11• Whenever E[v(θ)] > θ, adverse section is mild, which rules out separating equilibria.
Indeed, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if the aggregate allocation (Q,T) traded
by type θ were such that Q < 1, some buyer would have an incentive to induce both
types of the seller to trade this allocation, together with the additional quantity 1−Q
at a unit price between θ and E[v(θ)]. Competition among buyers then bids up the
price of the seller’s endowment to its average value E[v(θ)] for the buyers, a price at
which both types of the seller are ready to trade. This situation is depicted on Figure
5. The dotted line passing through the origin is the equilibrium indiﬀerence curve of
the buyers, with slope E[v(θ)].
—Insert Figure 5 here—
• Whenever E[v(θ)] < θ, adverse selection is severe, which rules out pooling equilibria.
This reﬂects that type θ is no longer ready to trade her endowment at the maximal price
E[v(θ)] at which buyers would break even in such an equilibrium. More interestingly,
our analysis shows that non-exclusive competition induces a speciﬁc cost of screening
the seller’s type in equilibrium. Indeed, any separating equilibrium must be such that
no buyer has an incentive to deviate and induce type θ to trade the aggregate allocation
(Q,T), together with the additional quantity 1 − Q at some mutually advantageous
price. Lemma 2 shows that to eliminate any incentive for buyers to engage in such
trades with type θ, the implicit unit price at which this additional quantity 1 − Q
can be sold in equilibrium must be at least v(θ). As shown in Lemma 4, this implies
at most an aggregate payoﬀ {E[v(θ)] − θ}Q for the buyers. Hence type θ can trade
actively in a separating equilibrium only in the non-generic case where E[v(θ)] = θ,
while type θ does not trade at all if E[v(θ)] < θ. This situation is depicted on Figure
6. The dotted line passing through the origin is the equilibrium indiﬀerence curve of
the buyers, with slope v(θ).
—Insert Figure 6 here—
3.2.2 Equilibrium Existence
We now establish that, in contrast with the exclusive competition game of Subsection 3.1, the
non-exclusive competition game always has an equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we show that there
always exists an equilibrium in which all buyers post linear prices. In such an equilibrium,
the unit price at which any quantity can be traded is equal to the expected quality of the






E[v(θ)] if E[v(θ)] ≥ θ,
v(θ) if E[v(θ)] < θ.
(1)
One then has the following result.
Proposition 2 The non-exclusive competition game always has an equilibrium in which
each buyer oﬀers the menu
{(q,t) ∈ [0,1] × R+ : t = p
∗q},
and thus stands ready to buy any quantity of the good at the constant unit price p∗.
In the non-generic case where E[v(θ)] = θ, it is easy to check that there exist two linear
price equilibria, a pooling equilibrium with constant unit price E[v(θ)] and a separating
equilibrium with constant unit price v(θ). In addition, there exists in this case a continuum
of separating equilibria in which type θ trades actively. Indeed, to sustain an equilibrium
trade level Q ∈ (0,1) for type θ, it is enough that all buyers oﬀer to buy any quantity of
the good at unit price v(θ), and that one buyer oﬀers in addition to buy any quantity of
the good up to Q at unit price E[v(θ)]. Both types θ and θ then sell a fraction Q of their
endowment at unit price E[v(θ)], while type θ sells the remaining fraction of her endowment
at unit price v(θ). To avoid this non-generic multiplicity issue and therefore simplify the
exposition, we shall assume that E[v(θ)] 6= θ in the remainder of this section.
3.2.3 Comparison with the Exclusive Competition Model
Our analysis provides a fully strategic foundation for Akerlof’s (1970) original intuition.
First, if adverse selection is severe enough, only goods of low quality are traded in equilibrium.
Second, as can be seen from (1), the price p∗ at which the seller can sell her endowment
in equilibrium is the expectation of the value of the good to the buyers, conditional on the
seller being willing to trade at this price:
p
∗ = E[v(θ)|θ ≤ p
∗].
These results contrasts sharply with the predictions of standard models of competition under
adverse selection, in which, as in the exclusive competition game of Subsection 3.1, exclusivity
clauses are assumed to be enforceable at no cost. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium outcomes of
the non-exclusive competition game diﬀer in three crucial ways from that of the exclusive
competition game:
13• First, the exclusive competition game has an equilibrium only if the probability that
the good is of high quality is low enough. By contrast, the non-exclusive competition
game always has an equilibrium.
• Second, when it exists, the equilibrium of the exclusive competition game is always
separating, while for certain parameter values all the equilibria of the non-exclusive
competition game are pooling.
• Third, even when all equilibria of the non-exclusive competition game are separating,
their structure is very diﬀerent from that of the exclusive competition game. In the
latter case, type θ is indiﬀerent between her equilibrium contract and that of type θ,
who trades a strictly positive fraction of her endowment. By contrast, in the former
case, type θ strictly prefers her aggregate equilibrium allocation to that of type θ, who
does not trade in equilibrium.
With regard to the last point, simple computations show that the threshold νe =
θ−θ
v(θ)−θ for
ν below which the exclusive competition game has an equilibrium is strictly greater than






for ν below which all equilibria of the non-exclusive
competition game are separating. Thus if one assumes that ν ≤ νe, so that equilibria exist
under both exclusivity and non-exclusivity, two situations can arise. When 0 < ν < νne, the
equilibrium is separating under both exclusivity and non-exclusivity, and more trade takes
place in the former case. By contrast, when νne < ν ≤ νe, the equilibrium is separating
under exclusivity and pooling under non-exclusivity, and more trade takes place in the latter
case. Therefore, from an ex-ante viewpoint, exclusive competition leads to a more eﬃcient
outcome under severe adverse selection, while non-exclusive competition leads to a more
eﬃcient outcome under mild adverse selection.
3.3 Equilibrium Menus and Latent Contracts
We now explore in more depth the structure of the menus oﬀered by the buyers in equilibrium.
We ﬁrst provide equilibrium restrictions for the price of issued and traded contracts. Next,
we show that a large number of latent contracts needs to be issued in equilibrium. Then, we
relate our analysis to the literature on communication in common agency games. Finally,
we show that the aggregate equilibrium allocations can also be sustained through non-linear
price schedules.
143.3.1 Price Restrictions
Our ﬁrst result provides equilibrium restrictions on the price of all issued contracts.
Proposition 3 The unit price of any contract issued in an equilibrium of the non-exclusive
competition game is at most p∗.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, if E[v(θ)] > θ and some buyer oﬀered
to purchase some quantity at a unit price above E[v(θ)], any other buyer would have an
incentive to induce both types of the seller to trade this contract and to sell him the remaining
fraction of their endowment at a unit price slightly below E[v(θ)]. Second, if E[v(θ)] < θ
and some buyer oﬀered to purchase some quantity at a unit price above v(θ), then any other
buyer would have an incentive to induce type θ to trade this contract and to sell him the
remaining fraction of her endowment at a unit price slightly below v(θ). As a corollary, one
obtains a straightforward characterization of the price of traded contracts.
Corollary 2 The unit price of any contract traded in an equilibrium of the non-exclusive
competition game is p∗.
3.3.2 Latent Contracts
With these preliminaries at hand, we can investigate which contracts need to be issued to
sustain the aggregate equilibrium allocations. From a strategic viewpoint, what matters for
each buyer is the outside option of the seller, that is, what aggregate allocations she can
achieve by trading with the other buyers only. For each buyer i, and for each menu proﬁle
(C1,...,Cn), this is described by the set of aggregate allocations that remain available if
buyer i withdraws his menu oﬀer Ci. One ﬁrst has the following result.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium of the non-exclusive competition game, the aggregate
allocation (1,p∗) remains available if any buyer withdraws his menu oﬀer.
The aggregate equilibrium allocation must therefore remain available even if a buyer
deviates from his equilibrium menu oﬀer. The reason is that this buyer would otherwise
have an incentive to oﬀer both types to sell their whole endowment at a price slightly below
E[v(θ)] (if E[v(θ)] > θ), or to oﬀer type θ to sell her whole endowment at price v(θ) while
oﬀering type θ to sell a smaller fraction of her endowment on more advantageous terms (if
E[v(θ)] < θ). The ﬂip side of this observation is that no buyer is essential in providing the
seller with her aggregate equilibrium allocation. This rules out standard Cournot outcomes
15in which the buyers would simply share the market and in which all issued contracts would
actively be traded by some type of the seller, as in Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000).
As an illustration, when there are two buyers, there is no equilibrium in which each buyer
would only oﬀer to purchase half of the seller’s endowment.
Because of the non-exclusivity of competition, equilibrium in fact involves much more
restrictions on menus oﬀers than those prescribed by Propositions 3 and 4. For instance, if
E[v(θ)] > θ, there is no equilibrium in which each buyer only oﬀers the allocation (1,E[v(θ)])
besides the no-trade contract. Indeed, any buyer could otherwise deviate by oﬀering to
purchase a quantity q < 1 at some price t ∈ (E[v(θ)] − θ(1 − q),E[v(θ)] − θ(1 − q)). By
construction, this is a cream-skimming deviation that attracts only type θ, and that yields
the deviating buyer a payoﬀ
ν[v(θ)q − t] > ν{v(θ)q − E[v(θ)] + θ(1 − q)},
which is strictly positive for q close enough to one. To block such deviations, latent contracts
must be issued that are not actively traded in equilibrium but which the seller has an
incentive to trade if some buyer attempts to break the equilibrium. In order to play this
deterrence role, the corresponding latent allocations must remain available if any buyer
withdraws his menu oﬀer. For instance, in the case E[v(θ)] > θ, the cream-skimming
deviation described above is blocked if the quantity 1 − q can always be sold at unit price
E[v(θ)] at the deviation stage, since both types of the seller then have the same incentives
to trade the contract proposed by the deviating buyer. This corresponds to the linear price
equilibrium described in Proposition 2. In this equilibrium, the number of latent contracts
is large; indeed, the menus oﬀered by the buyers are inﬁnite collections of contracts. The
following result shows that this is a robust feature of any equilibrium.
Proposition 5 In any equilibrium of the non-exclusive competition game, there are inﬁnitely
many aggregate allocations that remain available if any buyer withdraws his menu oﬀer.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As suggested by the above discussion, one of
the roles of latent contracts is to prevent cream-skimming deviations that only attract type
θ. Each buyer issues these contracts anticipating that type θ will have an incentive to trade
them following a cream-skimming deviation by any of the other buyers. Now, there are
inﬁnitely many such deviations. Consistent with this, the proof of Proposition 5 proceeds
by showing that if only ﬁnitely many latent contracts were oﬀered at equilibrium by buyers
j 6= i, it would be possible to construct a cream-skimming deviation for buyer i that would
yield him a strictly positive payoﬀ.
163.3.3 Menus, Communication, and the Failure of the Revelation Principle
Our results on the necessary role played by latent contracts to support equilibrium allocations
have a natural interpretation in the language of the common agency literature, whose aim is
to analyze situations where several principals compete through mechanisms for the services
of a single agent.10 In our context, given a set Mi of messages from the seller to buyer i, a
(deterministic) mechanism for buyer i is a mapping πi : Mi → [0,1] × R+ that associates
to each message sent by the seller to buyer i a quantity-transfer pair or contract. Let
Πi(Mi) be the set of mechanisms available to buyer i and Π(M1,...,Mn) =
Qn
i=1 Πi(Mi).
In the common agency game relative to Π(M1,...,Mn), the seller takes her participation
and communication decisions after having observed the proﬁle of mechanisms (π1,...,πn)
oﬀered by the diﬀerent buyers. Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) have proven the
following result, often referred to as the Delegation Principle: for any equilibrium outcome
relative to the space of mechanisms Π(M1,...,Mn), there exists an equilibrium that induces
the same outcome in the game where buyers oﬀer menus of contracts, provided any size
restrictions on the original message spaces Mi’s are translated into corresponding restrictions
on the allowed menus.
In our setting, buyers compete over menus of contracts for the trade of a divisible good.
From Proposition 5, we know that equilibrium menus should contain an inﬁnite number of
contracts. In view of the Delegation Principle, this suggests that to support our Akerlof-like
equilibrium outcomes when competition over mechanisms is considered, a rich structure of
communication has to be postulated. That is, an inﬁnite number of messages should be
available to the seller, allowing her to eﬀectively act as a coordinating device among buyers,
so as to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. In particular, these allocations cannot
be supported if buyers are restricted to compete through simple direct mechanisms of the
form ˆ γi : {θ,θ} → [0,1] × R+ through which the seller can only communicate her type to
the buyers. Indeed, if the buyers are restricted to direct mechanisms, only a ﬁnite set of
oﬀers will be available to the seller, which, as we have seen, makes it impossible to support
our equilibrium allocations. Critically, direct mechanisms do not provide enough ﬂexibility
to buyers to make a strategic use of the seller in deterring cream-skimming deviations.11
10To use the terminology of Bernheim and Whinston (1986b), our non-exclusive competition game is a
delegated common agency game, as the seller can choose a strict subset of buyers with whom she wants to
trade. Thus common agency is a choice variable that is delegated to the seller. See for instance Martimort
(2007) for a recent overview of the common agency literature.
11This diﬃculty would remain intact even if stochastic direct mechanisms were allowed. Indeed, in any
pure strategy equilibrium of a direct mechanism game where buyers use stochastic mechanisms, the seller
will send messages before observing the realization of uncertainty. At equilibrium, only a ﬁnite number of
17The possibility to support equilibrium allocations relative to an arbitrary set of indirect
mechanisms, but not in the corresponding direct mechanism game, has been acknowledged
as a failure of the Revelation Principle in common agency games, and documented in purely
abstract game-theoretic examples.12 One of the contribution of our analysis is to exhibit a
natural and relevant economic setting that exhibits this feature. Note furthermore that, in
contrast with the exclusive competition context, where market equilibria can without any
loss of generality be characterized through simple direct mechanisms, the restriction to such
mechanisms turns out to be devastating under non-exclusivity: indeed, in this context, an
immediate implication of our analysis is that no allocation can be supported at equilibrium
in the direct mechanism game.
3.3.4 Non-Linear Equilibria
We now show that one can also construct non-linear equilibria in which latent contracts
are issued at a unit price diﬀerent from that of the aggregate allocation that is traded in
equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The following holds:
(i) If E[v(θ)] > θ, then, for each φ ∈ [θ,E[v(θ)]), the non-exclusive competition game has
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This results shows that the unique aggregate equilibrium allocation can also be supported
through non-linear prices. In such equilibria, the price each buyer is willing to pay for an
additional unit of the good is not the same for all quantities purchased. For instance, in the
equilibrium for the severe adverse selection case described in Proposition 6(i), buyers are
not ready to pay anything for all quantities up to the level
ψ−v(θ)
ψ , while they are ready to
lotteries over allocations will be oﬀered. Bilateral risk-neutrality then makes this situation equivalent to one
in which only deterministic allocations are proposed. One should however observe that it is problematic to
interpret stochastic mechanisms in our model, where the seller operates under a capacity constraint.
12See for instance Peck (1997), Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002).
18pay ψ for each additional unit of the good above this level. The price schedule posted by
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to purchase the quantity q is strictly below θ, while the marginal price ψ at which he oﬀers
to purchase an additional unit given that he has already purchased a quantity q ≥
ψ−v(θ)
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strictly above θ. Therefore the equilibrium budget set of the seller
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is not convex in this equilibrium. As a result of this, the seller has a strict incentive to deal
with a single buyer: market equilibria can be supported with a single active buyer, provided
that the other buyers coordinate by oﬀering appropriate latent contracts. It follows in
particular that non-exclusive competition does not necessarily entail that the seller enters
into multiple contracting relationships.
This result contrasts with recent work on competition in non-exclusive mechanisms under
incomplete information, where attention is typically restricted to equilibria in which the
informed agent has a convex budget set in equilibrium, or, what amounts to the same thing,
where the set of allocations available to her is the frontier of a convex budget set.13 In
our model, this would for instance arise if all buyers posted concave price schedules. It is
therefore interesting to notice that, as a matter of fact, our non-exclusive competition game
has no equilibrium in which each buyer i posts a strictly concave price schedule T i. The
reason is that the aggregate price schedule T deﬁned by T(Q) = sup{
P
i T i(qi) :
P
i qi = Q}
would otherwise be strictly concave in the aggregate quantity traded Q. This would in
turn imply that contracts are issued at a unit price strictly above T(1), which, as shown by
Proposition 3, is impossible in equilibrium.
A further implication of Proposition 6 is that latent contracts supporting the equilibrium
allocations can be issued at a proﬁtable price for the issuer. For instance, in the equilibrium




×R+ : t = ψq −ψ +v(θ)
	
would yield its issuer a strictly positive payoﬀ, even if it were traded by type θ only. In
equilibrium, no mistakes occur, and buyers correctly anticipate that none of these contracts
will be traded. Nonetheless, removing these contracts would break the equilibrium. One
should notice in that respect that the role of latent contracts in non-exclusive markets has
usually been emphasized in complete information environments in which the agent does not
13See for instance Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000), Khalil, Martimort and Parigi (2007) or Martimort
and Stole (2009). Piaser (2007) oﬀers a general discussion of the role of latent contracts in incomplete
information settings.
19trade eﬃciently in equilibrium.14 In these contexts, latent contracts can never be proﬁtable.
Indeed, if they were, there would always be room for proposing an additional latent contract
at a less proﬁtable price and induce the agent to accept it. In our model, by contrast, type
θ sells her whole endowment in equilibrium. It follows from Proposition 3 that there cannot
be any latent contract that would make losses. In addition, there is no incentive for any
single buyer to raise the price of these contracts and make the seller willing to trade them.
4 The Continuous-Type Case
In this section, we show that the results derived so far extend to the case where the seller’s
type is continuously distributed. The model remains the same as in Section 2, but from
now on we assume that the seller’s type θ has a continuously diﬀerentiable distribution
F with strictly positive density f over a compact interval [θ, ¯ θ] of R++. The valuation
function v is assumed to be continuous; we will sometimes assume that v is increasing, as
is natural when the seller’s private information bears on the quality of the good. We shall
look for equilibria that verify a simple reﬁnement called conservativeness. Speciﬁcally, a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is conservative if a buyer cannot proﬁtably deviate by adding
one contract to his equilibrium menu, assuming that those types of the seller that would
strictly lose from trading the new contract do not change their behavior compared to the
equilibrium path. Hence conservativeness requires that the seller does not play an active role
in deterring deviations by a buyer if she does not beneﬁt from doing so.15 This requirement
was not needed in the study of the two-type case, because we were able to perfectly control
the trades of each type following a deviation. This is more diﬃcult with a continuum of
types, and for the sake of simplicity we choose to reinforce the equilibrium concept.
4.1 Monopsony
As a preliminary, it is useful to consider the monopsony case with a single buyer. Suppose
ﬁrst that the monopsony simply oﬀers to buy the seller’s whole endowment at price p.




[v(θ) − p]dF(θ). (2)
14See for instance Hellwig (1983), Martimort and Stole (2003), Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) or Attar and
Chassagnon (2009).
15Observe that this reﬁnement does not restrict in any way the behavior of the seller following a deviation
by a buyer who withdraws some or all of his equilibrium oﬀers. By contrast, in any subgame where the
reﬁnement has bite, the equilibrium utility of the seller remains available no matter her type.
20The function w is continuous, vanishes at θ, and is strictly decreasing beyond θ. It thus has
a maximum wm ≥ 0 that is attained at some point in [θ,θ]. To avoid ambiguities, deﬁne the
monopsony price pm as the highest such point. Now, assume that the monopsony can oﬀer
arbitrary menus of contracts, with quantities in [0,1]. From the Revelation Principle, there is
no loss of generality in focusing on direct revelation mechanisms (Q,T) : [θ,θ] → [0,1]×R+
that stipulate a quantity and a transfer as a function of the seller’s report of her type.16 The




subject to the seller’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
T(θ) − θQ(θ) ≥ T(θ0) − θQ(θ0),
T(θ) − θQ(θ) ≥ 0,
for all (θ,θ0) ∈ [θ,θ]2. In line with Samuelson (1984), we have the following result.
Lemma 5 Even when allowed to trade quantities in [0,1], the monopsony cannot do better
than oﬀering to buy the seller’s whole endowment at the price pm.
Hence allowing to trade any fraction of the seller’s endowment has no impact on the
solution to the monopsony problem. This may seem intuitive, as preferences are linear.
Nevertheless one must be cautious; as we now show, this option does impact equilibria when
buyers compete in exclusive contracts, despite the linearity of preferences.
4.2 Exclusive Competition
Suppose ﬁrst that buyers are restricted to bid for the seller’s whole endowment. Deﬁne p∗
as the supremum of those p such that w(p) > 0, setting p∗ = θ if there are none. Thus p∗ is
the highest price at which the seller’s whole endowment can be proﬁtably bought. As w is
continuous, we know that w(p∗) = 0, which can be rewritten under the more familiar form:
p
∗ = E[v(θ)|θ ≤ p
∗].
That is, p∗ satisﬁes the property put forward by Akerlof (1970): at price p∗ competitive
supply equals competitive demand, all seller’s types below p∗ sell their whole endowment,
16It is easy to check that, because of linear preferences, the monopsony cannot improve his payoﬀ by
oﬀering a stochastic mechanism.
21while seller’s types above p∗ do not trade at all. To avoid discussing non-generic cases we
assume that w(p) < 0 whenever p > p∗. Arguing as in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995, Proposition 13.B.1), one can then show that p∗ is the price that prevails in equilibrium
when buyers can only bid for the seller’s whole endowment.
Let us now allow for arbitrary trades, but restrict the seller to trade with a single buyer, as
in the exclusive competition game of Subsection 3.1. Recall that in the two-type case studied
then, equilibria under exclusive competition were similar to those derived by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976): equilibria are separating, and exist only under restrictive assumptions on
the seller’s type distribution. In the continuous-type case, non-existence of equilibria turns
out to be the rule, as we now explain.17 The intuition for this result is that exclusive
contracting allows buyers to design very precisely their oﬀers, so as to target the seller’s
types whose trades are proﬁtable to them. In particular, when a quantity strictly between
zero and one is traded, buyers can deviate by proposing to trade a lower or a higher quantity.
This ﬂexibility implies in turn the very strong zero-proﬁt condition that, in equilibrium, the
buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ must be zero on any type who trades such a quantity.18 Along
with the seller’s incentive compatibility condition, this greatly reduces the set of possible
equilibrium outcomes. When v is strictly increasing, all such allocations can be shown to be
vulnerable to a pooling oﬀer to buy the whole endowment from an interval of types.
Proposition 7 Suppose that v is strictly increasing. Then all conservative equilibria of
the exclusive competition game feature no trade. In particular, no equilibrium exists if the
monopsony payoﬀ wm is strictly positive.
4.3 Non-Exclusive Competition
By contrast, our ﬁrst result in this section is that an equilibrium always exists under non-
exclusive competition.
Proposition 8 The non-exclusive competition game always has a conservative equilibrium
in which each buyer oﬀers the menu
{(q,t) ∈ [0,1] × R+ : t = p
∗q},
and thus stands ready to buy any quantity of the good at the constant unit price p∗.
17Proposition 7 below is actually an instance of a folk theorem in the competitive screening literature, see
for instance Riley (2001, Subsection 3.1).
18On the set of types who trade their whole endowment, one can only show that the buyers’ aggregate
payoﬀ must be on average zero.
22Hence equilibria always exists, even when v is not monotonic. Observe that this linear
price equilibrium induces the Akerlof (1970) outcome: all seller’s types below p∗ sell their
whole endowment, while seller’s types above p∗ do not trade at all. Our second result is that
this must be the case in any conservative equilibrium.
Proposition 9 In any conservative equilibrium of the non-exclusive competition game, the
aggregate equilibrium allocations satisfy
(Q(θ),T(θ)) = (1,p
∗) if θ < p
∗ and (Q(θ),T(θ)) = (0,0) if θ > p
∗.
Since p∗ = E[v(θ)|θ ≤ p∗], each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any conservative equilibrium.
The intuition for this result can be easily understood in the context of a free-entry
equilibrium. Suppose that some type θ1 < p∗ sells a quantity Q1 < 1. Since the aggregate
quantity traded by the seller must by incentive compatibility be a decreasing function of her
type, it follows from the deﬁnition of p∗ that one can moreover choose θ1 such that w(θ1) > 0.
Then an entrant could oﬀer to buy 1 − Q1 at a unit price θ1. Clearly all types above θ1
would reject this new oﬀer. By contrast, type θ1 is indiﬀerent: if she accepts the oﬀer, she
sells 1 − Q1 units to the entrant, and she sells as before the remaining fraction Q1 of her
endowment to the other buyers. Because types below θ1 are more eager to sell, they must also
choose to sell their whole endowment, and therefore all accept the new oﬀer. The entrant’s
payoﬀ would then be (1 − Q1)w(θ1) > 0, meaning that entry would be proﬁtable. In the
proof of Proposition 9, we show that a deviation that makes the trade ((1−Q1),θ1(1−Q1))
available, in addition to the trades already oﬀered, is proﬁtable to at least one buyer. As
in our analysis of the two-type case, this buyer proposes a larger trade by pivoting on the
trades oﬀered by the other buyers.
Proposition 9 implies that aggregate quantities and transfers are uniquely determined in
equilibrium, and correspond to those that would obtain in the classical Akerlof (1970) model.
A distinctive feature of our model, though, is that buyers are strategic and compete for the
divisible good oﬀered by the seller by proposing to her non-exclusive menus of contracts.
Our results thus provide a solid game-theoretic foundation to Akerlof’s (1970) predictions.
Finally, observe that since p∗ ≥ pm, there is more trade under non-exclusive competition
than in the monopsony case, which does not come as a surprise.
4.4 Equilibrium Menus
We now explore the structure of the menus oﬀered by the buyers in equilibrium, and in
particular the role and necessity of latent contracts. Our ﬁrst results parallel Proposition 3
23and Corollary 2 and provide equilibrium restrictions on the price of all issued and traded
contracts.
Proposition 10 The unit price of any contract issued in a conservative equilibrium of the
non-exclusive competition game is at most p∗.
Corollary 3 The unit price of any contract traded in a conservative equilibrium of the non-
exclusive competition game is p∗.
As in the two-type case, these results illustrate how competition disciplines the buyers
in our model: even though they are allowed to propose arbitrary menus of contracts, in
equilibrium they end up trading at the same price. Even non-traded contracts must be
issued at a unit price at most equal to p∗: otherwise one of the buyers could strategically use
such a contract and pivot on it so as to increase his payoﬀ. It should be noted that if p∗ ≤ θ,
this last result can be proven without relying on a pivoting argument: indeed, if a contract
with unit price strictly above p∗ were issued, then type p∗ would have a strict incentive to
trade this contract instead of those that she trades in equilibrium, and so would all types
slightly below p∗ by continuity of the seller’s preferences with respect to her type.
We now investigate which contracts need to be issued to sustain the aggregate equilibrium
allocations. In line with Proposition 4, one ﬁrst has the following result.
Proposition 11 In any conservative equilibrium of the non-exclusive competition game, the
aggregate allocation (1,p∗) remains available if any buyer withdraws his menu oﬀer.
When E[v(θ)] > θ, the proof of this result is identical to that of its two-type counterpart.
However, when E[v(θ)] < θ, the proof is more involved in the continuous-type case. Indeed,
unlike in the two-type case, where there is a wedge between the type θ of the active seller
and the equilibrium price v(θ) at which all trades take place, in the continuous-type case
the equilibrium price is equal to the type p∗ of the marginal seller. This makes it impossible
for a buyer to screen types θ > p∗ from types θ ≤ p∗ at the deviation stage. Instead, we
show that if the allocation (1,p∗) did not remain available if a buyer removed his equilibrium
oﬀer, then for ε > 0 small enough this buyer could pivot on the aggregate allocation that
type p∗ −ε < p∗ would optimally trade with buyers j 6= i only, and secure a strictly positive
payoﬀ by trading with types θ < p∗ − ε.
We now argue that many contracts need to be issued to support equilibria, even though
each of these contracts has at most unit price p∗. Suppose for simplicity that the function
24v is strictly increasing, and consider types close to but below p∗. Because these types are
less eager to sell than type p∗, it is possible to deviate by oﬀering to buy a quantity slightly
below one at a unit price slightly above p∗. The fact that v is strictly increasing ensures that
the deviating buyer would obtain a positive payoﬀ from trading such a contract with the
types in question. However, the distinctive feature of non-exclusive competition is that other
types may also be attracted by the deviating buyer’s oﬀer. Indeed, these types could accept
the deviation, and sell the remaining part of their endowment to non-deviating buyers if the
latter oﬀer contracts that allow to trade small quantities at a price close enough to p∗. This
in turn proves necessary to support equilibria, as we now show.
Proposition 12 Suppose that v is strictly increasing. Then, in any conservative equilibrium
of the non-exclusive competition game, there exists Q0 > 0 such that it remains possible to
trade any quantity below Q0 if any buyer withdraws his menu oﬀer.
Proposition 12 implies that in equilibrium many contracts, in fact a continuum of them,
must be available. A similar conclusion was derived in the two-type case, though in the
case where E[v(θ)] < θ, we only established the necessity of a countably inﬁnite number
of contracts. A closer examination of the proof however reveals that the result depends on
whether there are at least two types that trade in equilibrium. In that respect, the two-type
case with E[v(θ)] < θ is somewhat special, because only one type of the seller is trading in
equilibrium.
Unlike in the two-type case, one cannot conclude from the fact that an inﬁnite number
of contracts must be available in equilibrium that latent contracts are necessary to support
equilibria. Indeed, the contracts characterized in Proposition 12 may be traded in equilibrium
by some types of sellers. It turns out that equilibria without latent contracts do exist. In
fact, unlike in the two-type case, the aggregate equilibrium allocations characterized in
Proposition 9 can be supported in an equilibrium of the direct mechanism game. To see
this, suppose that each buyer i proposes the seller to trade a quantity qi(ˆ θ) at unit price p∗
if she reports type ˆ θ to him, where the functions (q1,...,qn) satisfy
(i)
P
i qi(θ) = 1 for all θ < p∗ and
P
i qi(θ) = 0 for all θ > p∗;
(ii)
R p∗
θ [v(θ) − p∗]qi(θ)dF(θ) = 0 for all i;
(iii) qi([θ, ¯ θ]) = [0,1] for all i.
Property (i) ensures that each type of the seller trades her whole endowment or refrain from
trading altogether, as in the Akerlof (1970) outcome characterized in Proposition 9. Next,
25property (ii) ensures that each buyer obtains a zero payoﬀ. Finally, property (iii) ensures
that all contracts in {(q,t) ∈ [0,1] × R+ : t = p∗q} are indeed traded in equilibrium by at
least one type. Therefore there are no latent contracts. Finally these oﬀers indeed form an
equilibrium of the direct mechanism game, from Proposition 8.
To speak frankly, we think that such a construction is artiﬁcial, as it requires diﬀerent
types of the seller to behave diﬀerently when they in fact sell the same aggregate quantity
for the same aggregate transfer. One alternative would be to allow the seller to randomize
over the quantities that she trades with diﬀerent buyers; one is then back to the conclusion
that latent contracts are strictly speaking not needed. Notice however that this candidate is
not an equilibrium in direct mechanisms, as the quantity traded by any buyer depends not
only on the seller’s type, but also on the result of the seller’s randomization.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a simple imperfect competition model of trade under adverse
selection. When competition is exclusive, the existence of equilibria is problematic, while
equilibria always exist when competition is non-exclusive. In this latter case, aggregate
quantities and transfers are generically unique, and correspond to the allocations that obtain
in Akerlof’s (1970) model. Linear price equilibria can be constructed in which buyers stand
ready to purchase any quantity at a constant unit price. One can also construct equilibria
in which only one buyer trades with the seller.
The fact that possible market outcomes tightly depend on the nature of competition
suggests that the testable implications of competitive models of adverse selection should
be evaluated with care. Indeed, these implications are typically derived from the study of
exclusive competition models, such as Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) two-type model of
insurance markets. By contrast, our analysis shows that more competitive outcomes can
be sustained in equilibrium under non-exclusive competition, and that these outcomes can
involve a substantial amount of pooling.
These results oﬀer new insights into the empirical literature on adverse selection. For
instance, several studies have taken to the data the predictions of theoretical models of
insurance provision, without reaching clear conclusions.19 Cawley and Philipson (1999) argue
that there is little empirical support for the adverse selection hypothesis in life insurance.
In particular, they ﬁnd no evidence that marginal prices raise with coverage. Similarly,
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) ﬁnd that marginal prices do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer across
19See Chiappori and Salani´ e (2003) for a survey of this literature.
26annuities with diﬀerent initial annual payments. The theoretical predictions tested by these
authors are however derived from models of exclusive competition, while our results clearly
indicate that they do not hold when competition is non-exclusive, as in the case of life
insurance or annuities.20 Indeed, non-exclusive competition might be one explanation for
the limited evidence of screening and the prevalence of nearly linear pricing schemes on these
markets. As a result, more sophisticated procedures need to be designed in order to test for
the presence of adverse selection in markets where competition is non-exclusive.
20Chiappori, Jullien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (2006) have derived general tests based on a model of exclusive
competition, that they apply to the case of car insurance.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows more or less standard lines (see for instance
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, Chapter 13, Section D)) and goes through a series
of steps.
Step 1 Denote by (q,t) and (q,t) the contracts traded by the two types of the seller in
equilibrium. These contracts must satisfy the following incentive constraints:
t − θq ≥ t − θq,
t − θq ≥ t − θq.
Since the buyers always have the option not to trade, each of them must obtain at least a
zero payoﬀ in equilibrium. Suppose that some buyer’s equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly positive.
Then the buyers’ aggregate equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly positive,
ν[v(θ)q − t] + (1 − ν)[v(θ)q − t] > 0.
Any buyer i obtaining less than half of this amount in equilibrium can deviate by oﬀering a
menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of two new contracts. The ﬁrst one is
c
i(ε) = (q,t + ε),
for some strictly positive number ε, and is designed to attract type θ. The second one is
c
i(ε) = (q,t + ε),
for some strictly positive number ε, and is designed to attract type θ. To ensure that type θ
trades ci(ε) and type θ trades ci(ε) with him, buyer i can choose ε to be equal to ε when both
types’ equilibrium incentive constraints are simultaneously binding or slack, and choose ε
and ε to be diﬀerent but close enough to each other when one of these constraints is binding
and the other is slack. The change in buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is at least
1
2
{ν[v(θ)q − t] + (1 − ν)[v(θ)q − t]} − νε − (1 − ν)ε,
which is strictly positive for ε and ε close enough to zero. Thus each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero
in any equilibrium.
Step 2 Suppose that there exists a pooling equilibrium with both types of the seller
trading the same contract (qp,tp). It follows from Step 1 that tp = E[v(θ)]qp and that both
28types of the seller must trade with the same buyer j. Any buyer i 6= j can deviate by oﬀering




p − θε(1 + ε)),
for some strictly positive number ε. Trading ci(ε) decreases type θ’s payoﬀ by θε2 compared
to what she obtains by trading (qp,tp) with buyer j. Hence type θ does not trade ci(ε)
following buyer i’s deviation. By contrast, if ε < θ
θ − 1, trading ci(ε) allows type θ to
increase her payoﬀ by [θ − (1 + ε)θ]ε compared to what she obtains by trading (qp,tp) with
buyer j. Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation. The payoﬀ for buyer i
induced by this deviation is
ν{v(θ)q
p − t
p − [v(θ) − θ(1 + ε)]ε},
which is strictly positive for ε close enough to zero since tp = E[v(θ)]qp and v(θ) > E[v(θ)].
This, however, is impossible by Step 1. Thus any equilibrium must be separating, with the
two types of the seller trading diﬀerent contracts.
Step 3 Suppose that v(θ)q > t, so that the contract (q,t) yields the buyer who trades it
with type θ a strictly positive payoﬀ. Any buyer i can deviate by oﬀering a menu consisting
of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
i(ε) = (q,t + ε),
for some strictly positive number ε. Type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation, and
also possibly type θ. The payoﬀ for buyer i induced by this deviation is thus at least
(1 − ν)[v(θ)q − t − ε],
which is strictly positive for ε close enough to zero if v(θ)q > t. Since this is impossible by
Step 1, it must be that t ≥ v(θ)q. Suppose next that v(θ)q > t, so that the contract (q,t)
yields the buyer j who trades it with type θ a strictly positive payoﬀ. Any buyer i 6= j can
deviate by oﬀering a menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
i(ε) = (q − ε,t − θε(1 + ε)),
for some strictly positive number ε. As in Step 2, it is easy to check that type θ does not
trade ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation, while type θ does so provided ε < θ
θ −1. The payoﬀ
for buyer i induced by this deviation is
ν{v(θ)q − t − [v(θ) − θ(1 + ε)]ε},
29which is strictly positive for ε close enough to zero if v(θ)q > t. Since this is impossible by
Step 1, it must be that t ≥ v(θ)q. This, along with the facts that t ≥ v(θ)q and that the
buyers’ aggregate equilibrium payoﬀ is zero, implies that t = v(θ)q and t = v(θ)q. Thus the
contracts (q,t) and (q,t) are traded at unit prices v(θ) and v(θ), and no cross-subsidization
across types can take place in equilibrium.
Step 4 Suppose that type θ sells a quantity q < 1 in equilibrium. Any buyer i can deviate
by oﬀering a menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
i(ε) = (1,t + [v(θ) − ε](1 − q)),
for some strictly positive number ε. As long as ε < v(θ) − θ, trading ci(ε) allows type θ to
increase her payoﬀ by [v(θ) − θ − ε](1 − q) compared to what she obtains by trading (q,t).
Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation, and also possibly type θ. The payoﬀ
for buyer i induced by this deviation is thus at least
(1 − ν){v(θ) − t − [v(θ) − ε](1 − q)} = (1 − ν)(1 − q)ε,
where use was made of the fact that t = v(θ)q by Step 3. Since ε > 0, this payoﬀ is strictly
positive, which is impossible by Step 1. Thus type θ sells her whole endowment in any
equilibrium, and (q,t) = (qe,te) as deﬁned in Proposition 1.
Step 5 The contract (qe,te) is characterized by two properties: it has a unit price v(θ)
and type θ is indiﬀerent between (qe,te) and (qe,te). One cannot have q > qe, for (q,t) is
traded at unit price v(θ) by Step 3, and any contract in which a quantity strictly higher
than qe is traded at unit price v(θ) is strictly preferred by type θ to (qe,te). Now, suppose
that type θ trades (qe,te) with buyer j in equilibrium and that q < qe. Then type θ strictly
prefers (qe,te) to (q,t), that is, te − θqe > t − θq. Any buyer i 6= j can deviate by oﬀering a
menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
i(ε) = (q + ε,t + θε(1 + ε)),
for some strictly positive number ε. Trading ci(ε) decreases type θ’s payoﬀ by
t
e − θq
e − t + θq − [θ(1 + ε) − θ]ε
compared to what she obtains by trading (qe,te) with buyer j. Since te −θqe > t−θq, type
θ does not trade ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation if ε is close enough to zero. By contrast,
trading ci(ε) allows type θ to increase her payoﬀ by θε2 compared to what she obtains in
30equilibrium. Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation. The payoﬀ for buyer i
induced by this deviation is
ν[v(θ)(q + ε) − t − θε(1 + ε)] = ν[v(θ) − θ(1 + ε)],
where use was made of the fact that t = v(θ)q by Step 3. When ε <
v(θ)
θ − 1, this payoﬀ
is strictly positive, which is impossible by Step 1. Thus type θ sells a fraction qe of her
endowment in any equilibrium, and (q,t) = (qe,te) as deﬁned in Proposition 1.
Step 6 It follows from Steps 4 and 5 that if an equilibrium exists, the contracts that are
traded in this equilibrium are (qe,te) and (qe,te). To conclude the proof, one only needs to
determine under which circumstances it is possible to support this allocation in equilibrium.
Suppose ﬁrst that ν > νe. Any buyer i can deviate by oﬀering a menu consisting of the
no-trade contract and of the contract
˜ c
i(ε) = (1,v(θ)q
e + θ(1 − q
e) + ε),
for some strictly positive number ε. Using the fact that type θ is indiﬀerent between (qe,te)
and (qe,te), one can check that trading ˜ ci(ε) allows type θ to increase her payoﬀ by
v(θ)q
e + θ(1 − q
e) + ε − v(θ) = (θ − θ)(1 − q
e) + ε
compared to what she obtains by trading (qe,te). Hence type θ trades ˜ ci(ε) following buyer
i’s deviation. Similarly, trading ˜ ci(ε) allows type θ to increase her payoﬀ by ε compared to
what she obtains by trading (qe,te). Hence type θ trades ˜ ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation.
Simple computations show that the payoﬀ for buyer i induced by this deviation is
E[v(θ)] − v(θ)q
e − θ(1 − q
e) − ε = [v(θ) − v(θ)](ν − ν
e) − ε,
which is strictly positive for ε close enough to zero. Since this is impossible by Step 1, it
follows that no equilibrium exists when ν > νe. Suppose then that ν ≤ νe. Consider a
candidate equilibrium in which each buyer proposes the menu consisting of the no-trade
contract and of the contracts (qe,te) and (qe,te). Then, on the equilibrium path, it is a
best response for type θ to trade (qe,te) and for type θ to trade (qe,te). By Step 3, this
yields each buyer a zero payoﬀ. To verify that this constitutes an equilibrium, one ﬁrst
needs to check that no buyer can strictly increase his payoﬀ by proposing a single contract
besides the no-trade contract. By Steps 3, 4 and 5, there is no proﬁtable deviation that
would attract only one type of the seller. Moreover, a proﬁtable pooling deviation exists if
and only if, given the menus oﬀered in equilibrium, both types of the seller would have a
31strict incentive to sell their whole endowment at price E[v(θ)]. This is the case if and only if
E[v(θ)] > v(θ)qe +θ(1−qe), or equivalently ν > νe. Thus when ν ≤ νe, no menu consisting
of a single contract besides the no-trade contract can constitute a proﬁtable deviation. To
conclude the proof, one only needs to check that no buyer can strictly increase his payoﬀ
by oﬀering two contracts besides the no-trade contract, that attract both types of the seller.
The maximum payoﬀ that any buyer can achieve in this way is given by
max
(q,t,q,t)
{ν[v(θ)q − t] + (1 − ν)[v(θ)q − t]}
subject to the following incentive and participation constraints:
t − θq ≥ t − θq,
t − θq ≥ t − θq,
t − θq ≥ te − θqe,
t − θq ≥ te − θqe.
Note from the incentive constraints that q ≤ q. It is clear that at least one of the participation
constraints must be binding. Suppose ﬁrst that type θ’s participation constraint is binding.
If q ≤ qe, then the relevant constraint for type θ is her incentive constraint. It is then
optimal to let type θ be indiﬀerent between (q,t) and (q,t). Since v(θ) > θ, v(θ) > θ and
q ≤ qe, the maximum payoﬀ that the deviating buyer can achieve in this way is obtained
by oﬀering (q,t) = (q,t) = (qe,te), and is therefore strictly negative. If q > qe, then the
relevant constraint for type θ is her participation constraint. It is then optimal to let type θ
be indiﬀerent between (q,t) and (qe,te). One cannot have q > qe, for otherwise type θ would
strictly prefer (q,t) to (q,t). Since v(θ) > θ, v(θ) > θ and q ≤ qe, the maximum payoﬀ that
the deviating buyer can achieve in this way is obtained by oﬀering the equilibrium contracts
(qe,te) and (qe,te). Suppose ﬁnally that type θ’s participation constraint is binding. If q ≤ qe,
then the relevant constraint for type θ is her participation constraint. It is then optimal to
let type θ be indiﬀerent between (q,t) and (qe,te). Again, since v(θ) > θ, v(θ) > θ and
q ≤ qe, the maximum payoﬀ that the deviating buyer can achieve in this way is obtained by
oﬀering the equilibrium contracts (qe,te) and (qe,te). If q > qe, then the relevant constraint
for type θ is her incentive constraint. It is then optimal to let type θ be indiﬀerent between
(q,t) and (q,t). Simple computations show that the payoﬀ for the deviating buyer is
{ν[v(θ) − θ] − θ + θ}q + (1 − ν)[v(θ) − θ]q − t
e + θq
e.
32Since ν ≤ νe, v(θ) > θ and q > qe, this is at most equal to the payoﬀ that the deviating buyer
would obtain by oﬀering the equilibrium contracts (qe,te) and (qe,te). The result follows. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose instead that Q < 1. Any buyer i can deviate by oﬀering a
menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of two new contracts. The ﬁrst one is
c
i(ε) = (q
i + 1 − Q,t
i + (θ + ε)(1 − Q)),






and is designed to attract type θ. The key feature of this deviation is that type θ can sell
her whole endowment by trading ci(ε) together with the contracts cj, j 6= i. Since the unit
price at which buyer i oﬀers to purchase the quantity increment 1 − Q in ci(ε) is θ + ε,
this guarantees her a payoﬀ increase (1−Q)ε compared to what she obtains in equilibrium.
When ε is close enough to zero, she cannot obtain as much by trading ci(ε) instead. Indeed,
even if this were to increase her payoﬀ compared to what she obtains in equilibrium, the
corresponding increase would at most be ε2 < (1− Q)ε. Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following
buyer i’s deviation. Consider now type θ. By trading ci(ε) together with the contracts cj,
j 6= i, she can increase her payoﬀ by ε2 compared to what she obtains in equilibrium. By
trading ci(ε) instead, the most she can obtain is her equilibrium payoﬀ, plus the payoﬀ from
selling the quantity increment 1−Q at unit price θ+ε. For ε close enough to zero, θ+ε < θ
so that this unit price is too low from the point of view of type θ. Hence type θ trades ci(ε)
following buyer i’s deviation. The change in buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is
−νε
2 + (1 − ν)[v(θ) − θ − ε](1 − Q)
which is strictly positive for ε close enough to zero if Q < 1. Thus Q = 1, as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that p < θ in a separating equilibrium. Any buyer i can




i + 1 − Q,t
i + (p + ε)(1 − Q)),






33and is designed to attract type θ. The key feature of this deviation is that type θ can sell
her whole endowment by trading ci(ε) together with the contracts cj, j 6= i. Since the unit
price at which buyer i oﬀers to purchase the quantity increment 1 − Q in ci(ε) is p + ε,
this guarantees her a payoﬀ increase (1−Q)ε compared to what she obtains in equilibrium.
As in the proof of Lemma 1, it is easy to check that when ε is close enough to zero, she
cannot obtain as much by trading ci(ε) instead. Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer
i’s deviation. Consider now type θ. By trading ci(ε) together with the contracts cj, j 6= i,
she can increase her payoﬀ by ε2 compared to what she obtains in equilibrium. As in the
proof of Lemma 1, it is easy to check that when p + ε < θ, she cannot obtain as much by
trading ci(ε) instead. Hence type θ trades ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation. The change in
buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is
−νε




i + [v(θ) − p − ε](1 − Q)},
which must at most be zero for any ε close enough to zero. Since Q = 1 by Lemma 1,
summing over the i’s and letting ε go to zero then yields
v(θ)(Q − 1) − T + T + n[v(θ) − p](1 − Q) ≤ 0,
which, from the deﬁnition of p and the fact that Q < 1, implies that
(n − 1)[v(θ) − p] ≤ 0.
Since n ≥ 2, it follows that p ≥ v(θ), as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists. Any buyer i can deviate
by oﬀering a menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
˜ c
i(ε) = (q
i + 1 − Q,t
i + (θ + ε)(1 − Q)),
for some strictly positive number ε, that is designed to attract both types of the seller. The
key feature of this deviation is that both types can sell their whole endowment by trading
˜ ci(ε) together with the contracts cj, j 6= i. Since the unit price at which buyer i oﬀers to
purchase the quantity increment 1−Q in ˜ ci(ε) is θ+ε, and since θ ≥ p, this guarantees both
types of the seller a payoﬀ increase (1 − Q)ε compared to what they obtain in equilibrium.
Hence both types trade ˜ ci(ε) following buyer i’s deviation. The change in buyer i’s payoﬀ
induced by this deviation is





34which must at most be zero for any ε. Since Q = 1 by Lemma 1, summing over the i’s and
letting ε go to zero then yields
n{E[v(θ)] − θ}(1 − Q) + (1 − ν)[v(θ)(Q − 1) − T + T] ≤ 0,
which, from the deﬁnition of p and the fact that Q < 1, implies that
n{E[v(θ)] − θ} + (1 − ν)[p − v(θ)] ≤ 0.
Starting from this inequality, two cases must be distinguished. If p < θ, then Lemma 2
applies, and therefore p ≥ v(θ). It then follows that E[v(θ)] ≤ θ. If p = θ, the inequality
can be rearranged so as to yield
(n − 1){E[v(θ)] − θ} + ν[v(θ) − θ] ≤ 0.
Since n ≥ 2 and v(θ) > θ, it follows again that E[v(θ)] ≤ θ, which shows the ﬁrst part of
the result. Consider next some pooling equilibrium, and denote by (1,T) the corresponding
aggregate equilibrium allocation. To show that T = E[v(θ)], one needs to establish that
the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero in equilibrium. Let Bi be buyer i’s equilibrium payoﬀ,
which must be at least zero since each buyer always has the option not to trade. Buyer i
can deviate by oﬀering a menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
ˆ c
i(ε) = (1,T + ε),
for some strictly positive number ε. It is immediate that both types trade ˆ ci(ε) following
buyer i’s deviation. The change in payoﬀ for buyer i induced by this deviation is
E[v(θ)] − T − ε − B
i,
which must at most be zero for any ε. Letting ε go to zero yields
B





where the equality follows from the fact that each type of the seller sells her whole endowment
in a pooling equilibrium. Since this inequality holds for each i and all the Bi’s are at least
zero, they must all in fact be equal to zero. Hence T = E[v(θ)], as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose ﬁrst that a pooling equilibrium exists, and denote by (1,T)
the aggregate allocation traded by both types in this equilibrium. Then the buyers’ aggregate
payoﬀ is E[v(θ)]−T. One must have T −θ ≥ 0 otherwise type θ would not trade. Since the
35buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ must be at least zero in equilibrium, it follows that E[v(θ)] ≥ θ,
which shows the ﬁrst part of the result. Next, observe that in any separating equilibrium,
the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is equal to
(1 − ν)[v(θ) − T] + ν[v(θ)Q − T] = (1 − ν)[v(θ) − p(1 − Q)] + νv(θ)Q − T
by deﬁnition of p. One shows that p ≥ v(θ) in any such equilibrium. If p < θ, this follows
from Lemma 2. If p = θ, this follows from Lemma 3, which implies that θ ≥ E[v(θ)] > v(θ)
whenever a separating equilibrium exists. Using this claim along with the fact that T ≥ θQ,
one obtains that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is at most {E[v(θ)]−θ}Q. Since this must be
at least zero, one necessarily has (Q,T) = (0,0) whenever E[v(θ)] < θ. In particular, the
buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ (1 − ν)[v(θ) − p] is then equal to zero. It follows that p = v(θ) and
thus T = v(θ), which shows the second part of the result. 
Proof of Corollary 1. In the case of a pooling equilibrium, the result has been established
in the proof of Lemma 3. In the case of a separating equilibrium, it has been shown in
the proof of Lemma 4 that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is at most {E[v(θ)] − θ}Q. As a
separating equilibrium exists only if E[v(θ)] ≤ θ, it follows that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ
is at most zero in any such equilibrium. Since each buyer always has the option not to trade,
the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] ≥ θ, so that p∗ = E[v(θ)]. The proof
goes through a series of steps.
Step 1 Given the menus oﬀered, any best response of the seller leads to an aggregate trade
(1,E[v(θ)]) irrespective of her type. Assuming that each buyer trades the same quantity with
both types of the seller, all buyers obtain a zero payoﬀ.
Step 2 No buyer can proﬁtably deviate in such a way that both types of the seller trade
the same contract (q,t) with him. Indeed, such a deviation is proﬁtable only if E[v(θ)]q > t.
However, given the menus oﬀered by the other buyers, the seller always has the option to
trade quantity q at unit price E[v(θ)]. She would therefore be strictly worse oﬀ trading the
contract (q,t) no matter her type. Such a deviation is thus infeasible.
Step 3 No buyer can deviate in such a way that he obtains a strictly positive payoﬀ from
trading with type θ. Indeed, an additional contract (q,t) attracts type θ only if t ≥ E[v(θ)]q,
since she has the option to trade any quantity at unit price E[v(θ)]. The corresponding payoﬀ
for the deviating buyer is then at most {v(θ) − E[v(θ)]}q which is at most zero.
36Step 4 By Step 3, a proﬁtable deviation must attract type θ. An additional contract
(q,t) attracts type θ only if t ≥ E[v(θ)]q, since she has the option to trade any quantity at
unit price E[v(θ)]. However, type θ can then also weakly increase her payoﬀ by mimicking
type θ’s behavior. One can therefore construct the seller’s strategy in such a way that it is
impossible for any buyer to deviate by trading with type θ only.
Step 5 By Steps 3 and 4, a proﬁtable deviation must involve trading with both types.
Whatever the contract traded by the seller with the deviating buyer, and no matter her
type, she can sell to the other buyers the remaining fraction of her endowment at unit price
E[v(θ)]. Hence each type of the seller faces the same problem, namely to optimally use the
deviating buyer’s and the other buyers’ oﬀers to sell her whole endowment at the maximum
price. One can therefore construct the seller’s strategy in such a way that each type selects
the same contract from the deviating buyer’s menu. By Step 2, this makes such a deviation
non proﬁtable. Hence the result.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] < θ, so that p∗ = v(θ). Again, the proof goes through a series
of steps.
Step 1 Given the menus oﬀered, any best response of the seller leads to aggregate trades
(1,v(θ)) for type θ and (0,0) for type θ, and all buyers obtain a zero payoﬀ.
Step 2 No buyer can proﬁtably deviate in such a way that both types of the seller trade
the same contract (q,t) with him. Indeed, such a deviation is proﬁtable only if E[v(θ)]q > t.
Since θ > E[v(θ)], this however implies that t − θq < 0, so that type θ would be strictly
worse oﬀ trading the contract (q,t). Such a deviation is thus infeasible.
Step 3 No buyer can deviate in such a way that he obtains a strictly positive payoﬀ from
trading with type θ. Indeed, an additional contract (q,t) attracts type θ only if t ≥ v(θ)q,
since she always has the option to trade quantity q at unit price v(θ). The corresponding
payoﬀ for the deviating buyer is then at most zero.
Step 4 By Step 3, a proﬁtable deviation must attract type θ. An additional contract
(q,t) attracts type θ only if t ≥ θq. However, since θ > E[v(θ)] > v(θ), type θ can then
strictly increase her payoﬀ by trading the contract (q,t) and selling to the other buyers the
remaining fraction of her endowment at unit price v(θ). It is thus impossible for any buyer
to deviate by trading with type θ only.
Step 5 By Steps 3 and 4, a proﬁtable deviation must involve trading with both types.
37Given the menus oﬀered, the most proﬁtable deviations involve trading some quantity q at
unit price θ with type θ, and trading a quantity 1 at unit price θq +v(θ)(1−q) with type θ.
By construction, type θ is indiﬀerent between trading the contract (1,θq + v(θ)(1 − q)) and
trading the contract (q,θq) while selling to the other buyers the remaining fraction of her
endowment at unit price v(θ). As for type θ, she is indiﬀerent between trading the contract
(q,θq) and not trading at all. The corresponding payoﬀ for the deviating buyer is then
ν[v(θ) − θ]q + (1 − ν)[v(θ) − θq − v(θ)(1 − q)] = {E[v(θ)] − θ}q,
which is at most zero when E[v(θ)] < θ. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] > θ, so that p∗ = E[v(θ)]. Suppose
an equilibrium exists in which some buyer i oﬀers a contract ci = (qi,ti) at unit price
ti
qi > E[v(θ)]. Notice that one must have E[v(θ)] − ti ≥ θ(1 − qi) otherwise ci would give
type θ more than her equilibrium payoﬀ. Similarly, one must have qi < 1 otherwise ci would
give both types more than their equilibrium payoﬀ. Any other buyer j could oﬀer a menu
consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
j(ε) = (1 − q
i,E[v(θ)] − t
i + ε),
with 0 < ε < ti−qiE[v(θ)]. If both ci and cj(ε) were available, both types of the seller would
sell their whole endowment at price E[v(θ)] + ε by trading ci with buyer i and cj(ε) with
buyer j, thereby increasing their payoﬀ by ε compared to what they obtain in equilibrium.
Buyer j’s equilibrium payoﬀ is thus at least
E[v(θ)](1 − q
i) − {E[v(θ)] − t
i + ε} = t
i − q
iE[v(θ)] − ε > 0,
which is impossible since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any equilibrium by Corollary 1. Hence
no contract can be issued at a price strictly above E[v(θ)]. The result follows.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] < θ, so that p∗ = v(θ). Suppose an equilibrium exists in which
some buyer i oﬀers a contract ci = (qi,ti) at unit price ti
qi > v(θ). Notice that one must
have ti ≤ θqi otherwise ci would give type θ more than her equilibrium payoﬀ. Similarly,
one must have v(θ)−ti ≥ θ(1−qi) and qi < 1 otherwise ci would give type θ more than her
equilibrium payoﬀ. Any other buyer j could oﬀer a menu consisting of the no-trade contract
and of the contract
c
j(ε) = (1 − q
i,v(θ) − t
i + ε),
where 0 < ε < min{ti − qiv(θ),θ − v(θ)}. If both ci and cj(ε) were available, type θ would
38sell her whole endowment at price v(θ)+ε by trading ci with buyer i and cj(ε) with buyer j,
thereby increasing her payoﬀ by ε compared to what she obtains in equilibrium. Moreover,
since v(θ) + ε < θ, type θ would strictly lose from trading cj(ε) with buyer j. Buyer j’s
equilibrium payoﬀ is thus at least
(1 − ν){v(θ)(1 − q
i) − [v(θ) − t
i + ε]} = (1 − ν)[t
i − q
iv(θ) − ε] > 0,
which is impossible since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any equilibrium by Corollary 1. Hence
no contract can be issued at a price strictly above v(θ). The result follows. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] > θ, so that p∗ = E[v(θ)]. From
Proposition 3, no contract is issued, and a fortiori traded, at a unit price strictly above E[v(θ)]
in equilibrium. Suppose now that a contract with unit price strictly below E[v(θ)] is traded
in equilibrium. Then, since the aggregate allocation traded by both types is (1,E[v(θ)]), a
contract with unit price strictly above E[v(θ)] must be traded in equilibrium, a contradiction.
Hence the result.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] < θ, so that p∗ = v(θ). From Proposition 3, no contract is
issued, and a fortiori traded, at a unit price strictly above v(θ) in equilibrium. Suppose now
that a contract with unit price strictly below v(θ) is traded in equilibrium. Then, since the
aggregate allocation traded by type θ is (1,v(θ)), a contract with unit price strictly above
v(θ) must be traded in equilibrium, a contradiction. Hence the result. 

















be the set of aggregate allocations that remain available if buyer i withdraws his menu oﬀer
Ci. By construction, A−i is a compact set. One must show that (1,p∗) ∈ A−i.
Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] > θ, so that p∗ = E[v(θ)]. Suppose the aggregate allocation
(1,E[v(θ)]) traded by both types does not belong to A−i. Since A−i is compact, there exists
some open set of [0,1] × R+ that contains (1,E[v(θ)]) and that does not intersect A−i.
Moreover, any allocation (Q−i,T −i) ∈ A−i is such that T −i ≤ E[v(θ)]Q−i by Proposition 3.
Since E[v(θ)] > θ, this implies that A−i does not intersect the set of allocations that are
weakly preferred by both types to (1,E[v(θ)]). By continuity of the seller’s preferences, it
follows that there exists some strictly positive number ε such that the contract (1,E[v(θ)]−ε)
is strictly preferred by each type to any allocation in A−i. Thus, if this contract were
39available, both types would trade it. This implies that buyer i’s equilibrium payoﬀ is at
least ε, which is impossible since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any equilibrium by Corollary
1. Hence (1,E[v(θ)]) ∈ A−i. The result follows.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] < θ, so that p∗ = v(θ). Suppose the aggregate allocation
(1,v(θ)) traded by type θ does not belong to A−i. Since A−i is compact, there exists an
open set of [0,1]×R+ that contains (1,v(θ)) and that does not intersect A−i. Moreover, any
allocation (Q−i,T −i) ∈ A−i is such that T −i ≤ v(θ)Q−i by Proposition 3. Since θ < v(θ), this
implies that A−i does not intersect the set of allocations that are weakly preferred by type
θ to (1,v(θ)). Since the latter set is closed and A−i is compact, it follows that there exists
a contract (qi,t
i) with unit price t
i
qi ∈ (θ,v(θ)) such that the allocation (1,v(θ)) is strictly
preferred by type θ to any allocation obtained by trading the contract (qi,t
i) together with
some allocation in A−i.21 Moreover, since t
i
qi > θ, the contract (qi,t
i) guarantees a strictly
positive payoﬀ to type θ. Thus, if both (1,v(θ)) and (qi,t
i) were available, type θ would
trade (1,θ) and type θ would trade (qi,t
i). This implies that buyer i’s equilibrium payoﬀ
is at least ν[v(θ)qi − t
i] > 0, which is impossible since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any
equilibrium by Corollary 1. Hence (1,v(θ)) ∈ A−i. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix some equilibrium and some buyer i, and deﬁne the set A−i









to be the highest payoﬀ that a seller of type θ can get from trading with buyers j 6= i, when





−i + (θ − θ)Q
−i ≥ T
−i − θQ
−i + (θ − θ)Q
as long as Q−i ≤ Q. Taking maximums on both sides of this inequality yields
z
−i(θ,Q) ≥ z
−i(θ,Q) + (θ − ¯ θ)Q (3)
for all Q ∈ [0,1]. Now, let U(θ) be the equilibrium payoﬀ of type θ. It follows from
Proposition 4 that this payoﬀ remains available to type θ if buyer i withdraws his menu
oﬀer. Suppose that buyer i deviates by oﬀering a menu consisting of the no-trade contract
and of a contract (q,t) that is designed to attract only type θ. To ensure that this is so, one
21This follows directly from the fact that if K is compact and F is closed in some normed vector space X,
and if K ∩ F = ∅, then for any vector u in X, (K + λu) ∩ F = ∅ for any suﬃciently small scalar λ.
40imposes the following incentive compatibility constraints:
U(θ) > t − θq + z−i(θ,1 − q),
t − θq + z−i(θ,1 − q) > U(θ).
Clearly these constraints together require that
θq − z
−i(θ,1 − q) + U(θ) > θq − z
−i(θ,1 − q) + U(θ). (4)
The resulting payoﬀ for buyer i is then v(θ)q − t, which must at most be zero by Corollary
1. Since t can be as close as one wishes to θq − z−i(θ,1 − q) + U(θ), one thus obtains the
following implication: if q satisﬁes (4), then
[v(θ) − θ]q ≤ U(θ) − z
−i(θ,1 − q). (5)
Two cases must now be distinguished.
Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] > θ, so that U(θ) = E[v(θ)] − θ and U(θ) = E[v(θ)] − θ by
Lemma 3. Then (5) is false if and only if
z
−i(θ,1 − q) > E[v(θ)] − θ − [v(θ) − θ]q. (6)
Deﬁne q∗ =
E[v(θ)]−θ
v(θ)−θ , and observe that 0 < q∗ < 1. For q > q∗, the right-hand side of (6) is
negative, and thus (6) holds. Hence (5) is false, and therefore (4) is false as well:
z
−i(θ,1 − q) ≤ z
−i(θ,1 − q) + (θ − θ)(1 − q).
Letting Q = 1 − q and combining this inequality with (3), one obtains that
z
−i(θ,Q) = z
−i(θ,Q) + (θ − θ)Q (7)
for all Q < 1 − q∗. One now shows that (7) implies that for any such Q, and for any
solution (Q−i(θ,Q),T −i(θ,Q)) to the maximization problem that deﬁnes z−i(θ,Q), one has
Q−i(θ,Q) = Q. To see this, observe that the trade (Q−i(θ,Q),T −i(θ,Q)) is also feasible for





−i(θ,Q) + (θ − θ)Q
−i(θ,Q). (8)
The inequality in (8) cannot be strict, for otherwise z−i(θ,Q) > z−i(θ,Q) + (θ − θ)Q as
Q−i(θ,Q) ≤ Q, which would contradict (7). It follows that (8) holds as an equality, which
implies that Q−i(θ,Q) = Q by (7). Since this equality is true for all Q ∈ [0,1−q∗), it follows
41from the deﬁnition of z−i(θ,·) that there exists a continuum of distinct points in A−i. Hence
the result.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] < θ, so that U(θ) = v(θ) − θ, U(θ) = 0 and z−i(θ,·) = 0 by
Lemma 4. Then the right-hand side of (5) is zero, while the left-hand side is strictly positive
as long as q is strictly positive. Therefore (4) cannot hold for any such q, which implies that
v(θ) − θ − (θ − θ)q ≤ z
−i(θ,1 − q)
for all q ∈ (0,1]. Moreover, by Proposition 3, no contract can be issued at a price strictly
above p∗ = v(θ). Thus
z
−i(θ,1 − q) ≤ [v(θ) − θ](1 − q)
for all q ∈ (0,1]. Letting Q = 1 − q and combining these two inequalities, one obtains the
following lower and upper bounds for z−i(θ,Q):
v(θ) − θ + (θ − θ)Q ≤ z
−i(θ,Q) ≤ [v(θ) − θ]Q
for all Q ∈ [0,1). Since these bounds are strictly increasing in Q and coincide at Q = 1,
it follows from the deﬁnition of z−i(θ,·) that there exists a sequence in A−i composed of
distinct points that converges to (1,v(θ)). Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) The proof goes through a series of steps.
Step 1 Given the menus oﬀered, any best response of the seller leads to an aggregate
trade (1,E[v(θ)]) irrespective of her type. Since φ < E[v(θ)], it is optimal for each type of
the seller to trade her whole endowment with a single buyer. Assuming that each type of
the seller trades with the same buyer, all buyers obtain a zero payoﬀ. Note also that if any
buyer withdraws his menu oﬀer, the most the seller can achieve by trading with the other
buyers consists in trading with a single buyer.
Step 2 No buyer can proﬁtably deviate in such a way that both types of the seller trade
the same contract (q,t) with him. Indeed, such a deviation is proﬁtable only if E[v(θ)]q > t.
Since φ < E[v(θ)], the highest payoﬀ the seller can achieve by purchasing the contract (q,t)
together with some contract in the menu oﬀered by the other buyers is less than the payoﬀ
from trading the contract (1,E[v(θ)]), which remains available at the deviation stage. She
would therefore be strictly worse oﬀ trading the contract (q,t) no matter her type. Such a
deviation is thus infeasible.
42Step 3 No buyer can deviate in such a way that he obtains a strictly positive payoﬀ from
trading with type θ. Indeed, trading an additional contract (q,t) with type θ is proﬁtable
only if v(θ)q > t. The same argument as in Step 2 then shows that type θ would be strictly
worse oﬀ trading the contract (q,t) rather than the contract (1,E[v(θ)]), which remains
available at the deviation stage. Such a deviation is thus infeasible.
Step 4 By Step 3, a proﬁtable deviation must attract type θ. An additional contract
(q,t) that is proﬁtable when traded with type θ attracts her only if t + φ(1 − q) ≥ E[v(θ)],
that is, only if she can weakly increase her payoﬀ by trading the contract (q,t) and selling
to the other buyers the remaining fraction of her endowment at unit price φ. That this is
feasible follows from the fact that, when t + φ(1 − q) ≥ E[v(θ)] and v(θ)q > t, the quantity
1−q is less than the maximal quantity
v(θ)−E[v(θ)]
v(θ)−φ that can be traded at unit price φ with the
other buyers. Moreover, the fact that φ ≥ θ guarantees that it is indeed optimal for type θ
to behave in this way at the deviation stage. However, type θ can then also weakly increase
her payoﬀ by mimicking type θ’s behavior. One can therefore construct the seller’s strategy
in such a way that it is impossible for any buyer to deviate by trading with type θ only.
Step 5 By Steps 3 and 4, a proﬁtable deviation must involve trading with both types.
Whatever the contract traded by the seller with the deviating buyer, and no matter her type,
she will sell to the other buyers the remaining fraction of her endowment at unit price φ.
Hence, each type of the seller faces the same problem, namely to use optimally the deviating
buyer’s and the other buyers’ oﬀers to sell her whole endowment at the maximum price.
One can therefore construct the seller’s strategy in such a way that each type selects the
same contract from the deviating buyer’s menu. By Step 2, this makes such a deviation non
proﬁtable. The result follows.
(ii) The proof goes through a series of steps.
Step 1 Given the menus oﬀered, any best response of the seller leads to an aggregate
trade (1,v(θ)) for type θ and (0,0) for type θ. Since each buyer is not ready to pay anything
for quantities up to
ψ−θ
ψ and oﬀers to purchase each additional unit at a constant marginal
price ψ above this level, it is optimal for type θ to trade her whole endowment with a single
buyer, and all buyers obtain a zero payoﬀ. Note also that if any buyer withdraws his menu
oﬀer, the most the seller can achieve by trading with the other buyers consists in trading
with a single buyer.
Step 2 No buyer can proﬁtably deviate in such a way that both types of the seller trade
43the same contract (q,t) with him. This can be shown as in Step 2 of the ﬁrst part of the
proof of Proposition 2.
Step 3 No buyer can deviate in such a way that he obtains a strictly positive payoﬀ from
trading with type θ. Indeed, trading an additional contract (q,t) with type θ is proﬁtable
only if v(θ)q > t. Since ψ > v(θ), the highest payoﬀ type θ can achieve by purchasing the
contract (q,t) together with some contract in the menu oﬀered by the other buyers is less
than the payoﬀ from trading the contract (1,v(θ)), which remains available at the deviation
stage. She would therefore be strictly worse oﬀ trading the contract (q,t). Such a deviation
is thus infeasible.
Step 4 By Step 3, a proﬁtable deviation must attract type θ. An additional contract
(q,t) attracts type θ only if t ≥ θq. Two cases must be distinguished. If q ≤
v(θ)
ψ , then
type θ can trade the contract (q,t) and sell to some other buyer the remaining fraction of
her endowment at price ψ(1 − q) − ψ + v(θ). The price at which she can sell her whole
endowment is therefore at least (θ−ψ)q+v(θ), which is strictly higher than the price θ that
she obtains in equilibrium since θ > v(θ) +
θ−E[v(θ)]
1−ν ≥ ψ. If q >
v(θ)
ψ , then by trading the
contract (q,t), type θ obtains at least a payoﬀ
(θ−θ)v(θ)
ψ , which, since θ > ψ > v(θ), is more
than her equilibrium payoﬀ v(θ) − θ. Thus type θ can always strictly increase her payoﬀ
by trading the contract (q,t). It is therefore impossible for any buyer to deviate by trading
with type θ only.
Step 5. By Steps 3 and 4, a proﬁtable deviation must involve trading with both types.
Given the menus oﬀered, the most proﬁtable deviations lead to trading some quantity q ≤
v(θ)
ψ
at unit price θ with type θ, and trading a quantity 1 at unit price θq + v(θ) − ψq with type
θ. By construction, type θ is indiﬀerent between trading the contract (1,θq+v(θ)−ψq) and
trading the contract (q,θq) while selling to the other buyers the remaining fraction of her
endowment at price ψ(1 − q) − ψ + v(θ). As for type θ, she is indiﬀerent between trading
the contract (q,θq) and not trading at all. The corresponding payoﬀ for the deviating buyer
is then
ν[v(θ) − θ]q + (1 − ν){v(θ) − [θq + v(θ) − ψq]} = [νv(θ) + (1 − ν)ψ − θ]q,
which is at most zero since ψ ≤ v(θ) +
θ−E[v(θ)]
1−ν . The result follows. 
Proof of Lemma 5. For further reference, one solves here a slightly more general problem,
that is parameterized by (θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1), where θ ≤ θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ and 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ Q0 ≤ 1. This




subject to the seller’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
T(θ) − θQ(θ) ≥ T(θ0) − θQ(θ0),
T(θ) − θQ(θ) ≥ 0,
for all (θ,θ0) ∈ [θ,θ1]2, and to the two additional constraints that
Q(θ) = Q0
for all θ ∈ [θ,θ0], and that
Q(θ) ≥ Q1
for all θ ∈ [θ,θ1]. The monopsony problem corresponds to (θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1) = (θ,θ,1,0).
Letting U(θ) = T(θ) − θQ(θ), standard techniques imply that the incentive compatibility
constraints are equivalent to the two conditions that U(θ) =
R θ1
θ Q(ϑ)dϑ + U(θ1) for all
θ ∈ [θ,θ1] and that the function Q be decreasing over [θ,θ1] (Rochet (1985)). Clearly, the
participation constraint of the seller must be binding at θ1, U(θ1) = 0. Substituting for U(θ)
in the objective function and integrating by parts, the problem reduces to maximizing
Z θ1
θ




subject to the constraint that Q be decreasing, and to the two additional constraints stated
above. Observe that, for each p ∈ [θ,θ1],
Z p
θ








which, from the integration by parts formula for functions of bounded variation (Dellacherie






45where Q+ is the right-continuous regularization of Q such that Q+(θ1) = Q1.22 Since Q is
decreasing and bounded below by Q1, d(Q0 − Q+) is a positive measure of mass Q0 − Q1
over [θ,θ1]. Moreover, since Q = Q0 over [θ,θ0], d(Q0 − Q+) does not charge [θ,θ0). Thus
the maximum in (10) is reached by putting all the weight of the measure d(Q0 − Q+) on a
maximum point of the function w over [θ0,θ1], yielding a payoﬀ
Q1w(θ1) + (Q0 − Q1) sup
θ∈[θ0,θ1]
{w(θ)}. (11)
In the case of the monopsony, (θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1) = (θ,θ,1,0). It then follows from (11) and from
the deﬁnition of pm that the maximum payoﬀ that the monopsony can obtain is wm = w(pm).
Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider a conservative equilibrium in which each type θ sells
a quantity Q(θ) and obtains a payoﬀ U(θ). Deﬁne Bi(θ) as the payoﬀ obtained by buyer
i from trading with type θ. For the purpose of this proof, it is convenient to extend these
functions to (θ,∞), which raises no diﬃculty.23 Consistent with this, a type hereafter refers
to an arbitrary element of [θ,∞). Note that Q(θ) goes to 0 as θ goes to inﬁnity. Observe
that U(θ) =
R θ
θ Q(ϑ)dϑ+U(θ) by the envelope theorem; thus U is aﬃne over an interval of
types if and only if Q is constant over the interior of this interval; moreover U is convex as
Q is decreasing by incentive compatibility. The following result will be used repeatedly.












[v(θ)q0 − t0]dF(θ) ≤
Z θb
θa
[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ) − U(θ)]dF(θ). (13)
Proof. Since U0(θ) = −Q(θ) except at most for a countable number of types, q0 is an average
of the quantities sold by types in [θa,θb]. Because U is not aﬃne over this interval, it must be
that these quantities take at least two diﬀerent values. Therefore Q(θb) < q0 < Q(θa). Any
22To apply the integration by parts formula, observe that one can assume without loss of generality that
Q is left-continuous.
23That is, for each θ ∈ (θ,∞), simply set U(θ) = sup{ti − θqi : (qi,ti) ∈ Ci for some i} and arbitrarily
select some Q(θ) in argmax{ti − θqi : (qi,ti) ∈ Ci for some i}. As for the Bi(θ)’s, it is immaterial how
they are deﬁned outside of the support of the seller’s type distribution. For consistency we shall nevertheless
assume that they add up to [v(θ)−θ)]Q(θ)−U(θ), as for types belonging to the support of the seller’s type
distribution.
46buyer i can deviate by adding to his equilibrium menu the contract (q0,t0). By deﬁnition of
q0 and t0 one has
U(θa) = t0 − θaq0 and U(θb) = t0 − θbq0, (14)
so that types θa and θb are indiﬀerent to this new oﬀer. Consider a type θ ∈ (θa,θb). If this
type were also indiﬀerent, then the convex function U would have to be equal to the aﬃne
mapping θ 7→ t0 − θq0 over the interval [θa,θb], contradicting the assumption. Thus type θ
cannot be indiﬀerent, and because U is convex it must be that U(θ) < t0 − θq0. Therefore
all types in (θa,θb) are strictly better oﬀ trading the contract (q0,t0). Consider now types
θ > θb. Convexity of U implies that for these types U(θ) ≥ U(θb)−Q(θb)(θ −θb), and using
(14) along with the fact that q0 > Q(θb) yields
U(θ) ≥ t0 − θq0 + [q0 − Q(θb)](θ − θb) > t0 − θq0
for all θ > θb. Therefore all types θ > θb are strictly worse oﬀ trading the contract (q0,t0). As
the equilibrium under scrutiny is assumed to be conservative, such types do not change their
behavior following buyer i’s deviation. The same properties can similarly be established for
all types θ < θa. The change in buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is thus
Z θb
θa
[v(θ)q0 − t0 − B
i(θ)]dF(θ),
which must at most be zero. Summing over the i’s and using the fact that the buyers’
aggregate payoﬀ is
P
i Bi(θ) = [v(θ) − θ)]Q(θ) − U(θ) for any type θ then yields (13). 
Deﬁne kQk∞ = inf{q > 0 :
R
1{Q(θ)≤q} dF(θ) = 1} to be the essential supremum of the
set of quantities traded in equilibrium. Deﬁne ˆ θ = sup{θ ∈ [θ,θ] : Q(θ) = kQk∞}, letting
ˆ θ = θ if this set is empty. If kQk∞ = 0 then the equilibrium essentially features no trade,
which implies that even a monopsony could not extract any rent from the seller, that is
wm = 0. One now proves that any equilibrium must indeed be such that kQk∞ = 0, and
therefore that no equilibrium exists whenever wm > 0. The following result holds.
Lemma 7 If kQk∞ > 0, the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when a quantity at most equal
to kQk∞ is sold by some type in [θ,θ]. Moreover, if ˆ θ < θ < θ,
U(θ) = [v(θ) − θ]Q(θ), (15)
so that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when the seller’s type is θ.
Proof. The proof goes through a series of steps.
47Step 1 Let θ0 ∈ [θ,θ] be a type who sells a quantity Q(θ0) ≤ kQk∞, and suppose that
θ0 is the only type in [θ,θ] who sells Q(θ0) and that Q is continuous at θ0. One can then




[v(θ)q0 − U(θa) − θaq0]dF(θ) ≤
Z θb
θa
[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ) − U(θ)]dF(θ). (16)
Because Q is continuous at θ0 and U(θ) =
R θ
θ Q(ϑ)dϑ + U(θ), U is diﬀerentiable at θ0 and
U0(θ0) = −Q(θ0). It thus follows from the deﬁnition (12) of q0 that q0 goes to Q(θ0) as θa
and θb go to θ0. Using the fact that v, U and Q are continuous at θ0, one can then divide
(16) by F(θb) − F(θa) and take limits as θa and θb go to θ0 to obtain
n[v(θ0)Q(θ0) − U(θ0) − θ0Q(θ0)] ≤ [v(θ0) − θ0]Q0 − U(θ0)
so that [v(θ0)−θ0]Q(θ0)−U(θ0) ≤ 0 as n ≥ 2. Observe that since Q is decreasing, it has at
most a countable number of discontinuity points. Thus, with the exception of such points,
this inequality holds for any type θ0 who is the only type in [θ,θ] who sells Q(θ0) ≤ kQk∞.
Step 2 Let θ0 ∈ [θ,θ] be a type who sells a quantity Q(θ0) ≤ kQk∞, and suppose now
that there exists a maximal interval of types in [θ,θ] containing θ0, with lower bound θ1 and
upper bound θ2 > θ1, and such that any type in this interval sells Q(θ0). Observe that one
may have Q(θ0) = kQk∞ and thus θ1 = θ, and that one may also have θ2 = θ. In any case,
since kQk∞ > 0 and Q(θ) goes to 0 as θ goes to inﬁnity, one can choose θa and θb such that
θ ≤ θa ≤ θ1 < θ2 < θb and apply Lemma 6. Observe that if θ2 = θ and thus θb > θ, the
integrals on each side of (13) can be taken over the range [θa,θ]. Taking limits as θa goes to




[v(θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ) − θQ(θ0)]dF(θ) ≤
Z θ2
θ1
[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ)
so that
R θ2
θ1 [(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ) ≤ 0 as n ≥ 2.
Step 3 It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that, with the possible exception of quantities traded
by at most a countable number of types in [θ,θ], the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is at most zero
when any quantity in Q([θ,θ])) ∩ [0,kQk∞] is sold. Because the buyer’s aggregate payoﬀ
must be at least zero since each buyer always has the option not to trade, it follows that the
buyer’s aggregate payoﬀ is exactly zero when any quantity in Q([θ,θ])) ∩ [0,kQk∞] is sold,
with the possible exception of quantities traded by a set of types of measure zero under the
distribution F. Clearly each buyer’s payoﬀ is exactly equal to zero.
48Step 4 Now, let θ0 ∈ (θ,θ] be a type who sells a quantity Q(θ0) ∈ (0,kQk∞), and suppose
that there exists a maximal interval of types in (θ,θ] containing θ0, with lower bound θ1 and
upper bound θ2 > θ1, and such that any type in this interval sells Q(θ0). The diﬀerence
with Step 2 is that one must have θ1 > θ as Q(θ0) < kQk∞. One can therefore choose
θa < θ1 < θb < θ2, and apply Lemma 6. Taking the limit as θa goes to θ1 then yields
Z θb
θ1
[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ) ≤ 0 (17)
for all θb ∈ (θ1,θ2). Similarly, since Q(θ0) > 0 and Q(θ) goes to 0 as θ goes to inﬁnity, one
can choose θa and θb such that θ1 < θa < θ2 < θb and apply Lemma 6. As in Step 2, observe
that if θ2 = θ and thus θb > θ, the integrals on each side of (13) can be taken over the range
[θa,θ]. Taking limits as θb goes to θ2 then yields
Z θ2
θa
[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ) ≤ 0 (18)
for all θa ∈ (θ1,θ2). Since
R θ2
θ1 [(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ) = 0 by Step 3, it follows from
(17) and (18) that the mapping ˜ θ 7→
R ˜ θ
θ1[(v(θ) − θ)Q(θ0) − U(θ)]dF(θ) is identically zero
over (θ1,θ2). Since v is continuous and Q(θ) = Q(θ0) for all θ ∈ (θ1,θ2), it follows by
diﬀerentiation that (15) holds for all θ ∈ (θ1,θ2).
Step 5 If there exists a maximal interval of types in [θ,θ] with lower bound θ1 and upper
bound θ > θ1, and such that any type in this interval sells zero, then clearly all these types
must obtain a zero payoﬀ, for otherwise the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ when a quantity zero
is sold would be strictly negative, contradicting Step 3. It follows that (15) holds for all
θ ∈ (θ1,θ].
Step 6 By Steps 4 and 5, (15) holds for any type in the interior of a pooling interval
contained in [θ,θ], as long as the quantity sold by all types in this interval is strictly below
kQk∞. By Steps 1 and 3, (15) also holds for any type who is the only type in [θ,θ] who sells
a quantity at most kQk∞, except perhaps for a set of set of types of measure zero under
the distribution F. Thus (15) holds for any type in (ˆ θ,θ), except perhaps for a set of set of
types of measure zero under the distribution F. Now let θ0 ∈ (ˆ θ,θ) be one of these possibly
problematic types. If v(θ0) 6= θ0, one can deduce from the fact that v and U are continuous
and that (15) holds along sequences of types converging to θ0 from below and from above
that Q is continuous at θ0 and that (15) also holds at θ0. If v(θ0) = θ0, one can deduce from
the continuity of the functions v and U and from the fact that (15) holds along a sequence
of types converging to θ0 that U(θ0) = 0, so that (15) also holds at θ0 since v(θ0) = θ0, no
matter the value of Q(θ0).
49Step 7 By Step 6, (15) holds for any type in (ˆ θ,θ). To conclude, one need only to check
that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when a quantity kQk∞ is sold. One knows from
Steps 2 and 3 that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when the quantity kQk∞ is sold by
a non trivial interval of types in [θ,θ]. Now, if kQk∞ is sold by θ only, so that ˆ θ = θ, then
Q must be continuous at θ, by deﬁnition of kQk∞. Since, by Step 6, (15) holds along a
sequence of types converging to θ and since v, U and Q are continuous at θ, (15) also holds
at θ in this case. The result follows. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 7, we show that kQk∞ = 0. Supposing by way of
contradiction that kQk∞ > 0, three cases need to be distinguished.
Case 1 Suppose ﬁrst that ˆ θ = θ, so that Q(θ) < kQk∞ ≤ 1 for all θ > θ. By Lemma
7, it follows that (15) holds everywhere over (θ,θ). Moreover, since U0(θ) = −Q(θ) except
at most for a countable number of types, the mapping θ 7→ U(θ) + θ is strictly increasing.
Any buyer i can deviate by adding to his equilibrium menu the contract (1,U(θ0) + θ0), for
some θ0 > θ. All types θ < θ0 are strictly better oﬀ trading this contract, while all types
θ > θ0 are strictly worse oﬀ trading it. As the equilibrium under scrutiny is assumed to
be conservative, the latter do not change their behavior following buyer i’s deviation. The
change in buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is thus
Z θ0
θ
[v(θ) − U(θ0) − θ0 − B
i(θ)]dF(θ),
which must at most be zero. Summing over the i’s and using the fact that the buyers’
aggregate payoﬀ is
P




[v(θ) − U(θ0) − θ0]dF(θ) ≤ 0
for all θ0 > θ. Observe that g is absolutely continuous and diﬀerentiable except at most for
a countable number of types, with a derivative that satisﬁes
g
0(θ0) = [v(θ0)−U(θ0)−θ0]f(θ0)−[1−Q(θ0)]F(θ0) = [1−Q(θ0)]{[v(θ0)−θ0]f(θ0)−F(θ0)},
where the second equality follows from the fact that (15) holds everywhere over (θ,θ). One
now proves that g0 whenever deﬁned is strictly positive in a right-neighborhood of θ, which
implies that g(θ0) > 0 for θ0 close enough to θ, a contradiction. To prove this, observe ﬁrst
that 1 − Q(θ0) > 1 − kQk∞ ≥ 0 as θ0 > θ. Second, since Q(θ) goes to kQk∞ > 0 as θ goes
to θ, and since U0(θ) = −Q(θ) except at most for a countable number of types, one has
U(θ) > 0. As v and U are continuous, this in turn implies by (15) that v(θ) > θ. Since by
50assumption f is bounded away from zero over [θ,θ] and F vanishes at θ, this implies that
[v(θ0) − θ0]f(θ0) − F(θ0) > 0 in a right-neighborhood of θ. The claim then follows from the
above expression for g0(θ0).
Case 2 Suppose next that ˆ θ = θ, so that all types in (θ,θ) exactly sell kQk∞. Since by
Lemma 7 the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when the quantity kQk∞ is sold, this must be
against a transfer E[v(θ)]kQk∞. Any buyer i can deviate by adding to his equilibrium menu
the contract (q0,U(θ0) + θ0q0), for some q0 < kQk∞ and θ0 ∈ (θ,θ). All types θ > θ0 are
strictly better oﬀ trading this contract, while all types θ < θ0 are strictly worse oﬀ trading
it. As the equilibrium under scrutiny is assumed to be conservative, the latter do not change
their behavior following buyer i’s deviation. Observe that U(θ0) = {E[v(θ)]−θ0}kQk∞. The
change in buyer i’s payoﬀ induced by this deviation is thus
Z θ
θ0
[v(θ)q0 − {E[v(θ)] − θ0}kQk∞ − θ0q0 − B
i(θ)]dF(θ)
which must at most be zero. Summing over the i’s and using the fact that the buyers’
aggregate payoﬀ is
P
i Bi(θ) = [v(θ)−θ)]Q(θ)−U(θ) = {v(θ)−E[v(θ)]}kQk∞ for any type




{v(θ) − E[v(θ)]}dF(θ) ≤ 0,
so that
R θ
θ0 {v(θ)−E[v(θ)]}dF(θ) ≤ 0 as n ≥ 2 and kQk∞ > 0. This, however, is impossible
as θ0 > θ and v is strictly increasing.
Case 3 Suppose ﬁnally that θ < ˆ θ < ¯ θ, so that all types in (θ, ˆ θ) exactly sell kQk∞.
Since by Lemma 7 the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is zero when the quantity kQk∞ is sold, this
must be against a transfer E[v(θ)|θ ≤ ˆ θ]kQk∞. One can then choose θa and θb such that
θ < θa < ˆ θ < θb and apply Lemma 6 to get (16). As θb goes to ˆ θ, q0 goes to kQk∞. Since




{v(θ) − E[v(θ)|θ ≤ ˆ θ]}kQk∞ dF(θ) ≤
Z ˆ θ
θa
{v(θ) − E[v(θ)|θ ≤ ˆ θ]}kQk∞ dF(θ)
so that
R ˆ θ
θa{v(θ) − E[v(θ)|θ ≤ ˆ θ]}dF(θ) ≤ 0 as n ≥ 2 and kQk∞ > 0. Using the fact that
v is continuous, one can then divide this inequality by F(ˆ θ) − F(θa) and take the limit as
θa goes to ˆ θ to obtain v(ˆ θ) ≤ E[v(θ) | θ ≤ ˆ θ]. This, however, is impossible as v is strictly
increasing. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof goes through a series of steps.
51Step 1 Given the menus oﬀered, any best response of the seller leads to aggregate trades
(1,p∗) for types θ < p∗ and (0,0) for types θ > p∗. Assuming that each buyer trades the same
quantity with each type of the seller, all buyers obtain a zero payoﬀ as p∗ = E[v(θ)|θ ≤ p∗].
Step 2 An additional contract (q,t) attracts a type θ ≤ p∗ only if t ≥ p∗q, since she has
the option to trade any quantity at unit price p∗. Hence each type θ ≤ p∗ faces the same
problem, namely to optimally use the deviating buyer’s and the other buyers’ oﬀers to sell her
whole endowment at the maximum price. One can therefore construct the seller’s strategy
in such a way that each type θ ≤ p∗ selects the same contract (q,t) from the deviating
buyer’s menu. Since t ≥ p∗q and p∗ = E[v(θ)|θ ≤ p∗], this implies that no deviation can be
proﬁtable over types θ ≤ p∗. Observe that since each type θ ≤ p∗ attempts to maximize
t − θq + (p
∗ − θ)(1 − q) = t − p
∗q + p
∗ − θ
over the menu of contracts (q,t) oﬀered by the deviating buyer, one has t − p∗q ≥ t − p∗q
for any such contract.
Step 3 If θ > p∗, a deviating buyer may also attempt to attract some types θ > p∗. Over
this set of types, he eﬀectively acts as a monopsony, since none of them has an incentive
to sell to the other buyers at unit price p∗. Now, take any contract (q,t) in the deviating
buyer’s menu, and suppose that q > q. Then, since t−p∗q ≥ t−p∗q by Step 2, one a fortiori
has t − θq > t − θq for all θ > p∗, so that each type θ > p∗ would rather trade (q,t) than
(q,t). It follows that the types θ > p∗ sell at most q to the deviating buyer. For any ﬁxed




subject to the seller’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
t − p∗q ≥ t(θ) − p∗q(θ),
t(θ) − θq(θ) ≥ t(θ0) − θq(θ0),
t(θ) − θq(θ) ≥ 0,




for all θ0 ∈ [θ,p∗] and that
q(θ) ≤ q
52for all θ ∈ (p∗,θ]. This last constraint along with the constraint that t−p∗q ≥ t(θ)−p∗q(θ)
implies that t−θ0q ≥ t(θ)−θ0q(θ) for all (θ,θ0) ∈ (p∗,θ]×[θ,p∗]. Thus the deviating buyer’s
payoﬀ is at most equal to the value of the problem studied in the proof of Lemma 5, with
(θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1) = (p∗,θ,q,0), that is, by (11), q supθ∈[p∗,θ] {w(θ)} = 0. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider a conservative equilibrium in which each type θ sells
an aggregate quantity Q(θ) and obtains a payoﬀ U(θ). Deﬁne Bi(θ) as the payoﬀ obtained
by buyer i from trading with type θ. Deﬁne also θ0 as the supremum of those types that sell
their whole endowment, setting θ0 = θ if there are none. By the maximum theorem, one can
without loss of generality assume that type θ0 sells her whole endowment. If θ0 = θ, the result
follows, as Q is decreasing by incentive compatibility. Otherwise, take some θ1 ∈ (θ0,θ], and














Any buyer i can deviate by adding to his equilibrium menu the contract
˜ c
i = (q
i(θ1) + 1 − Q(θ1),t
i(θ1) + θ1[1 − Q(θ1)]).
The seller reacts to this deviation depending on her type θ. Each type θ > θ1 strictly prefers
(qi(θ1),ti(θ1)) to ˜ ci, because the unit price θ1 at which ˜ ci allows her to sell the quantity
increment 1 − Q(θ1) is too low from her point of view. As the equilibrium under scrutiny
is assumed to be conservative, type θ does not change her behavior following buyer i’s
deviation. Each type θ < θ1 can sell her whole endowment by trading ˜ ci together with the
contracts (qj(θ1),tj(θ1)), j 6= i, thereby obtaining a payoﬀ
t




j(θ1) − θ = U(θ1) + θ1 − θ > U(θ),
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that U(θ) =
R θ1
θ Q(ϑ)dϑ + U(θ1) by the
envelope theorem, and that Q < 1 over (θ0,θ1]. Since U(θ) is the highest payoﬀ type θ can
obtain by rejecting ˜ ci, it follows that she trades ˜ ci following buyer i’s deviation. The change




i(θ1) + 1 − Q(θ1)]v(θ) − t
i(θ1) − θ1[1 − Q(θ1)] − B
i(θ)}dF(θ),
which must at most be zero. Using the deﬁnition of w, we obtain
[q







53Summing over the i’s and using (19) and the fact that the buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ is
P
i Bi(θ) = [v(θ) − θ)]Q(θ) − U(θ) for any type θ then yields
{Q(θ1) + n[1 − Q(θ1)]}w(θ1) ≤
Z θ1
θ









where the equality follows from an integration by parts. Note that the right-hand side of
(20) is (9). By incentive compatibility, Q is decreasing, which in particular implies that
Q(θ) ≥ Q(θ1) for all θ ∈ [θ,θ1]; moreover, Q(θ) = Q0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θ0]. It follows that the
buyers’ aggregate payoﬀ on the right-hand side of (20) is at most equal to the value of the
problem studied in the proof of Lemma 5, with (θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1) = (θ0,θ1,1,Q(θ1)), that is,
by (11), Q(θ1)w(θ1) + [1 − Q(θ1)]supθ∈[θ0,θ1] {w(θ)}. Substituting in (20) and simplifying as





















Using the deﬁnition of p∗ along with the fact that w is strictly decreasing beyond θ, this
implies that θ0 ≥ p∗, so that Q(θ) = 1 for θ < p∗. It follows that the buyers’ aggregate
payoﬀ is at most equal to the value of the problem studied in the proof of Lemma 5, with
(θ0,θ1,Q0,Q1) = (p∗,θ,1,0), that is, by (11), supθ∈[p∗,θ] {w(θ)} = 0. Proceeding as for (10),









where the equality reﬂects the fact that the measure d(1−Q+) does not charge [θ,p∗) since
Q = 1 over [θ,p∗]. Since by assumption w < 0 over (p∗,θ], and since the buyers’ aggregate
payoﬀ must be at least zero in equilibrium, it follows from (21) that d(1−Q+) is a unit mass
at p∗, so that Q = 0 over (p∗,θ]. Hence the result. 
54Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose a conservative equilibrium exists in which some buyer
i oﬀers a contract ci = (qi,ti) at unit price ti
qi > p∗. One must have qi < 1 otherwise ci would
give types θ < ti
qi more than their equilibrium payoﬀ. Any other buyer j could oﬀer a menu
consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
j(ε) = (1 − q
i,(p
∗ − ε)(1 − q
i)),
where 0 < ε <
ti−p∗qi
1−qi . If both ci and cj(ε) were available, each type θ < p∗ − ε would sell
her whole endowment at price ti +(p∗ −ε)(1−qi) by trading ci with buyer i and cj(ε) with
buyer j, thereby increasing her payoﬀ by ti −p∗qi −ε(1−qi) compared to what she obtains
in equilibrium. By contrast, types θ > p∗−ε do not gain by trading cj(ε) with buyer j, since
the unit price at which this contract is issued is too low from their point of view. Buyer j’s




∗ + ε](1 − q
i)dF(θ) = (1 − q
i)w(p
∗ − ε),







however, is impossible, since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any conservative equilibrium by
Proposition 8. Hence no contract can be issued at a price strictly above p∗ in such an
equilibrium. The result follows. Observe that if p∗ ≤ θ, so that p∗ is in the support of the
seller’s type distribution, a much simpler proof goes as follows: if ti
qi > p∗, then
p∗−ti
1−qi < p∗.









, so that ci would give any
such type more than her equilibrium payoﬀ, a contradiction. This argument breaks down
whenever p∗ > θ, so that p∗ does not correspond to a possible type for the seller. 
Proof of Corollary 3. From Proposition 10, no contract is issued, and a fortiori traded,
at a unit price strictly above p∗ in a conservative equilibrium. Suppose ﬁrst that a contract
with unit price strictly below p∗ is traded by some type θ < p∗ in a conservative equilibrium.
Then, since the aggregate allocation traded by type θ is (1,p∗), a contract with unit price
strictly above p∗ must be traded in this equilibrium, a contradiction. Suppose next that
p∗ ≤ θ and that a contract with unit price strictly below p∗ is traded by type p∗ in a
conservative equilibrium. Then, since type p∗’s payoﬀ is zero, a contract with unit price
strictly above p∗ must be traded in this equilibrium, a contradiction. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Fix some conservative equilibrium and some buyer i, and deﬁne
the set A−i as in the proof of Proposition 4. One must show that (1,p∗) ∈ A−i.
55Assume ﬁrst that E[v(θ)] > θ, so that p∗ = E[v(θ)]. Then the argument is exactly the
same as in the ﬁrst case examined in the proof of Proposition 4.
Assume next that E[v(θ)] ≤ θ, so that p∗ ≤ θ. Suppose the aggregate allocation (1,p∗)
traded by types θ < p∗ does not belong to A−i. Since A−i is compact, there exists an open set
of [0,1]×R+ that contains (1,p∗) and that does not intersect A−i. Moreover, any allocation
(Q−i,T −i) ∈ A−i is such that T −i ≤ p∗Q−i by Proposition 10. For ε close enough to zero, any
solution (Q−i(p∗−ε,1),T −i(p∗−ε,1)) to the maximization problem that deﬁnes z−i(p∗−ε,1)
must be such that Q−i(p∗ − ε,1) is bounded away from one: otherwise, there would exist a
sequence {εn}n≥1 converging to zero and a sequence {(Q−i(p∗ − εn,1),T −i(p∗ − εn,1))}n≥1
in A−i such that the sequence {Q−i(p∗ − εn,1)}n≥1 converges to one and
T
−i(p
∗ − εn,1) − (p
∗ − εn)Q
−i(p
∗ − εn,1) ≥ 0
for all n ≥ 1. Taking limits as n goes to inﬁnity and using the fact A−i is compact, this
would imply that the quantity one can be traded in an aggregate allocation in A−i at a price
at least p∗, a contradiction. Now let (Q−i(p∗ − ε,1),T −i(p∗ − ε,1)) be the solution to the
maximization problem that deﬁnes z−i(p∗ − ε,1) with highest quantity traded. From the
above argument, one can choose ε in such a way that Q−i(p∗ − ε,1) < 1. By deﬁnition of
p∗, one can further choose ε in such a way that w(p∗ − ε) > 0. Buyer i could oﬀer a menu
consisting of the no-trade contract and of the contract
c
i(ε) = (1 − Q
−i(p
∗ − ε,1),(p
∗ − ε)[1 − Q
−i(p
∗ − ε,1)]).
Consider any type θ < p∗−ε, and let (Q−i(θ,1),T −i(θ,1)) be a solution to the maximization
problem that deﬁnes z−i(θ,1). By incentive compatibility, Q−i(θ,1) ≥ Q−i(p∗ − ε,1). If
Q−i(θ,1) = Q−i(p∗ − ε,1) and thus T −i(θ,1) = T −i(p∗ − ε,1), type θ could sell her whole
endowment at price T −i(θ,1)+(p∗−ε)[1−Q−i(p∗−ε,1)] by trading the aggregate allocation
(Q−i(θ,1),T −i(θ,1)) with buyer j 6= i and the contract ci(ε) with buyer i, thereby increasing
her payoﬀ by (p∗−ε−θ)[1−Q−i(p∗−ε,1)] compared to what she could obtain from trading
with buyers j 6= i only. If Q−i(θ,1) > Q−i(p∗ − ε,1), one has
T
−i(p
∗ − ε,1) − (p
∗ − ε)Q
−i(p




by deﬁnition of Q−i(p∗ − ε,1), from which it follows that
T −i(p∗ − ε,1) + (p∗ − ε)[1 − Q−i(p∗ − ε,1)] > T −i(θ,1) + (p∗ − ε)[1 − Q−i(θ,1)]




∗ − ε,1) + (p
∗ − ε)[1 − Q
−i(p
∗ − ε,1)] − θ > T
−i(θ,1) − θQ
−i(θ,1).
Thus, by trading the aggregate allocation (Q−i(p∗−ε,1),T −i(p∗−ε,1)) with buyer j 6= i and
the contract ci(ε) with buyer i, type θ would strictly increase her payoﬀ compared to what
she could obtain from trading with buyers j 6= i only. Thus, in any case, all types θ < p∗−ε
would trade ci(ε) if this contract were oﬀered by buyer i. By contrast, types θ > p∗ − ε do
not gain by trading ci(ε) with buyer i, since the unit price at which this contract is issued




∗ + ε][1 − Q
−i(p




which is strictly positive by assumption. This, however, is impossible, since each buyer’s
payoﬀ is zero in any conservative equilibrium by Proposition 8. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 12. Fix some conservative equilibrium and some buyer i, and deﬁne





0 − θ)Q (22)
for all (Q,θ,θ0) ∈ [0,1]×[θ,θ]2 such that θ ≥ θ0, so that the mapping θ 7→ z−i(θ,Q)+θQ is
increasing over [θ,θ] for all Q ∈ [0,1]. Proceeding as for (7), one can further show that if this
function is constant over some interval of types, then, for any type θ in this interval, and for
any solution (Q−i(θ,Q),T −i(θ,Q)) to the maximization problem that deﬁnes z−i(θ,Q), one
has Q−i(θ,Q) = Q, so that there is an aggregate allocation in A−i that allows the seller to
exactly trade the quantity Q. One now shows that this is the case for any quantity Q close
enough to zero, which implies the result. To see this, ﬁx some θ0 ∈ (θ,min{p∗, ¯ θ}) and some









Then buyer i could oﬀer a menu consisting of the no-trade contract and of a contract
(1 − Q0,t0) such that θ0 is indiﬀerent between trading the contract (1 − Q0,t0) with buyer
i along with some aggregate allocation in A−i with buyers j 6= i, and trading with buyers
j 6= i only, and therefore getting her equilibrium utility as shown in Proposition 11:
t0 − θ0(1 − Q0) + z
−i(θ0,Q0) = p
∗ − θ0.
57Now, from (23), all types θ > θ0 strictly prefer accepting buyer i’s oﬀer to selling their whole
endowment at price p∗, while all types θ < θ0 strictly prefer to their whole endowment at
price p∗. As for types θ > p∗, they satisfy z−i(θ,Q0) = 0 since they obtain a zero payoﬀ in
equilibrium. Hence any such type accepts buyer i’s oﬀer if t0 > θ(1 − Q0), or equivalently
θ < θ1, where
t0 = θ1(1 − Q0) = θ0(1 − Q0) + p
∗ − θ0 − z
−i(θ0,Q0).
It is easily checked that θ1 ≥ p∗ if and only if (p∗ − θ0)Q0 ≥ z−i(θ0,Q0), which is indeed
the case since, by Proposition 10, no contract is issued at a price strictly above p∗ in a
conservative equilibrium. It thus follows that the contract (1 − Q0,t0) oﬀered by buyer i
attracts all types in some interval (θ0,θ1), with θ0 < p∗ ≤ θ1, that types θ0 and θ1 are




[v(θ)(1 − Q0) − t0]dF(θ). (24)
Now let Q0 go to zero. Then z−i(θ0,Q0) goes to zero as (p∗−θ0)Q0 ≥ z−i(θ0,Q0) ≥ 0, so that
t0 and θ1 go to p∗. Hence the limit of (24) is
R p∗
θ0 [v(θ) − p∗]dF(θ), which is strictly positive
since v−p∗ is strictly increasing, θ0 ∈ (θ,min{p∗, ¯ θ}), and
R p∗
θ [v(θ)−p∗]dF(θ) = w(p∗) = 0.
This, however, is impossible, since each buyer’s payoﬀ is zero in any conservative equilibrium
by Proposition 9. The result follows. 
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Figure 6 Aggregate equilibrium allocations when E[v(θ)] < θ
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